


JPRS-TAC-89-019
9 MAY 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-019

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NATO-Warsaw Treaty Talks on Conventional Arms Viewed

52004001 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 10, 6 Mar 89 pp 30-31

[Article by Hsiao Li: "Outlook for Talks on Conventional Forces in Europe"]

[Text]Special dispatch from Vienna The talks on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE], in which 23 countries of the two great military blocs, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, will take part, will open on 6 March in the Austrian capital of Vienna. At the same time, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's [CSCE] talks on confidence- and security-building measures (namely, the second stage of the Stockholm conference) will also begin. They will be the first talks by East and West on Europe-wide conventional disarmament.

The CFE talks are the result of the breaking by East and West of their deadlock and their promoting of the progress of disarmament. In February 1987 the Warsaw Treaty and NATO held preparatory talks in Vienna. After 2 years of arduous effort they finally reached agreement. On 2 February of this year, the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Central Europe, which had been going on for 15 years without result, ended, thereby formally giving way to the CFE talks.

Warsaw Treaty's Challenge

Then, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles was reached, at the CFE preparatory talks the Soviet Union made one concession after another: it agreed to enhance European security and stability by establishing stable and reliably balanced conventional forces, and to eliminate the capability to launch a sudden attack and a large-scale offensive; it agreed to put all the Outer Caucasus region within the scope of Europe-wide disarmament talks, and to put into effect measures for exchanging reports on military strength and for accepting on-the-spot verification checks for disarmament purposes.

The Warsaw Treaty bloc, in July and October of last year, made proposals that included restricting the scales and times of troop mobilization, restricting military exercises by air and naval forces, establishing a European "confidence- and security-building region," freezing and cutting military expenditure, enhancing and dialogue and information exchange between the blocs, as well as holding a summit conference of all European countries, America, and Canada. In December of last year, Gorbachev announced at the UN General Assembly a unilateral cut of 500,000 troops, including the withdrawal from Eastern Europe of 50,000 troops and 5,000 tanks. At the CSCE in Vienna in January of this year, Soviet Foreign Minister Zhevardnadze also announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw from Eastern Europe

some of its tactical nuclear weapons and would cut its military expenditure by 14.5 percent. Some other Warsaw Treaty member countries also, one after another, announced unilateral disarmament steps.

The purpose of the Warsaw Treaty countries' decisions to cut conventional forces was to launch, before the CFE talks, a public opinion offensive in order to exert pressure on NATO, divide Europe and America, and wreck the plan for modernizing short-range missiles.

NATO's Passivity

With its many internal contradictions it is difficult for the West to deal with the Warsaw Treaty's conventional disarmament offensive that it now faces. It welcomed the Warsaw Treaty's unilateral disarmament steps, but also emphasized that it would make its decisions on the proposals after conducting a thorough analysis. NATO also indicated that, even after the Soviet Union took these unilateral disarmament steps, it would still occupy the dominant position, and so the West would not copy the Warsaw Treaty by taking corresponding disarmament steps. Thus far the NATO member countries have not set up a unified defense strategy, and they are faced with contradictions from all directions in maintaining defense expenditure and in replacing and replenishing weapons.

The differences of opinion within NATO are prominently manifested in America's and Federal Germany's different evaluations of the Soviet Union's present policy and their different attitudes toward the modernization of NATO's short-range missiles. America and Britain think that the Soviet conventional forces still possess an offensive capability, that a judgement on the Soviet Union's present policy must be made on the basis of the results of Gorbachev's reforms, and that if these reforms do not achieve the results desired by the West then NATO must maintain a powerful defense and be prepared for any contingency. They advocate that, before the talks with the Soviet Union begin, a decision be made to modernize short-range missiles and to upgrade the Lance short-range missile. Federal Germany thinks that the Soviet armed forces have entered the stage of "structural readjustment" and that Gorbachev's disarmament steps reflect a "change from the principle of maintaining super-armed forces to the principle of maintaining a rational and adequate defense." It opposes the balancing of the Soviet Union's conventional superiority by means of the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. Chancellor Kohl has indicated that the modernization of Federal Germany's short-range missiles will depend on the progress of the talks, and that no decision on this modernization will be made before the talks on Soviet and American strategic weapons and on conventional disarmament in Europe take place.

The Current Situation and the Prospect for the Talks

The reaching of an agreement to hold the CFE talks reflected a change and a movement in position closer by East and West on the issue of conventional disarmament.

In its measures for conventional disarmament, the Warsaw Treaty first of all decided that the two sides need to remove the imbalances in all categories of conventional forces, that is: withdrawing the forces from stipulated disarmament zones and then disbanding them; and under international supervision destroying the relevant conventional weapons and equipment, converting them to civilian use, or sealing them up for safekeeping for a long period of time. Next, each side's existing forces would be cut by 25 percent (namely, by 500,000 troops and their equipment), and then, step by step, an agreement would be reached on the maximum ceiling of the conventional military forces of the two sides. Afterward there would be further cuts in each side's conventional military forces until their capability was limited to defense. Finally, in the first stage of the talks, from among the priority disarmament zones established between the two sides there would be found and cut those types of conventional weapons that pose the greatest threat to the maintenance of balance and stability. The Warsaw Treaty also demanded that, before the talks begin, the two sides not, in the disarmament zones about to be discussed, add new conventional military forces and equipment; each side is to exchange data on its basic military strength and to conduct on-site verification checks before the talks begin.

NATO has agreed in principle to the Warsaw Treaty proposals, but has stressed that the basis on which there will be cuts in each side's military forces determines the maximum ceiling of a country's military forces that are stationed outside the country, and it has ruled impermissible that this ceiling exceed 30 percent of the country's total military forces. NATO has also expressed its opposition to the establishment at the present time of the disarmament zones between the two sides, and has indicated that it would not meet the commitment to not add forces in them before the talks.

As of now, the tentative plan in the talks for a four-stage conventional disarmament process on which NATO and the Warsaw Treaty have initially reached agreement is: in the first stage the Warsaw Treaty forces be cut down to the level of the NATO forces; in the second stage the Warsaw Treaty and NATO will simultaneously take disarmament steps in equal proportion; in the third stage the nature of the military deployment will be changed, that is, the deployment of an offensive nature with tanks and armored vehicles comprising the main part will be changed to a deployment of a defensive nature; and in the fourth stage a decision will be made on the number of troops stationed in foreign countries.

The prospect of the talks on conventional disarmament in Europe gives no cause for optimism. The first problem that the talks will encounter is that of balancing the forces. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty respectively, in last year and at the beginning of this year, made public their military strengths in Europe. NATO's data show that the Warsaw Treaty, no matter whether in number of troops, tanks, or aircraft, or with regard to artillery,

possesses absolute superiority, and that even if the Soviet Union unilaterally cuts 500,000 troops NATO will still be in an inferior position. Therefore, NATO demands that the Warsaw Treaty countries cut their existing conventional forces by 50 percent, and that the number of tanks of the two sides in Europe be limited to about 40,000. The Warsaw Treaty's data show that the two sides are roughly equal in the number of army and air force personnel, and that the Warsaw Treaty is superior in the number of tanks, tactical missile launchers, battle vehicles, and armored vehicles, but that NATO has more than double the Warsaw Treaty's naval forces. The Warsaw Treaty demands that NATO make cuts in these respects and that each side's military strength be kept at a defensive level.

The differences and contradictions within the NATO bloc on the question of arms control and disarmament will adversely affect the CFE talks.

Commentary Views History, Future of NATO

*HK0105150489 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 15 Apr 89 p 4*

["Weekly Commentary" by Guo Zhengping: "What Is Puzzling the 40-Year-Old NATO?"]

[Text] The 40th founding anniversary of NATO fell on 4 April this year. NATO could indeed have arranged some elaborate celebrations. However, according to reports, celebrations in its member countries were "basically subdued" and "no more than what is appropriate." Actually, the "40-year-old" NATO is at a loss as to which direction to go in. Why?

At its founding, NATO had well-defined goals. To deal with the socialist East European countries, headed by the Soviet Union, the West European countries had to remain united. However, given their meager strength, they had to look to the United States as their leader. Of course, the United States could not have been more eager to comply with their request. In the face of the threat posed by the Soviet Union's great offensive military strength in the ensuing decades, Western Europe has remained dependent on the "protective umbrella" provided by the United States. However, the situation has changed a great deal over the past few years.

External conditions have changed. Politically, the serious antagonism between Eastern Europe and Western Europe is being replaced by consultation and dialogue. U.S.-Soviet summits, Soviet-European summits, and a meeting between the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to discuss disarmament have successively taken place. No one can deny that the political climate in Europe has changed. In the military field, the tension and confrontation between Eastern and Western Europe are being superseded by detente and a cooling-off. Since the signing of the INF treaty last year, the armed strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact has declined for the first time and NATO has temporarily suspended its annual

large-scale live-ammunition military exercise, code-named "Return to Germany [hui shi de guo 0932 1597 1795 0948]." On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact, represented by the Soviet Union, has changed its strategic thinking from offensive to defensive; on the question of military buildup, has shifted its stress from maintaining supremacy to making it "reasonable and adequate"; and on the question of the deployment of troops, has changed from placing the main thrust of its forces in the front to placing it in the rear. Although it will take the Soviet Union some time to thoroughly readjust its military strategy, it is evident that the wheels have started to turn. Economically, Eastern and Western Europe are undergoing a transition from closeness to each other toward fusion. In June last year, the European Community [EC] established official relations with CEMA with a view to seeking access to Eastern Europe's natural resources and market and mutual development using West European capital. Some members of the EC and CEMA also hope to go beyond bloc boundaries to develop bilateral and multilateral economic relations and trade, and are toying with the idea of forming a central European economic league. There is more than one "unfaithful wife cheating on her husband" and "doors are left ajar."

Internal conditions have also changed. Internal contradictions within NATO, particularly those between the United States and Europe, are becoming increasingly acute. The United States has repeatedly stressed that the Soviet Union expends more energy on its propaganda campaigns than on practical matters and that although its expansion has been checked somewhat, there have not been any substantive changes, and the West should still keep its strength intact and remain vigilant. However, West European countries have told it: Do not keep "crying wolf." The United States has suggested that NATO's short-range missiles be immediately modernized. However, West Germany is lukewarm about it, and Norway, Denmark, and Greece are against it. The United Kingdom is the only partner that resolutely supports it. On the other hand, the United States would not like to see large amounts of loans and technical know-how channeled into the Soviet Union. However, West European countries have successively invested money in the Soviet Union and either overtly or covertly provided it with advanced technical know-how. To coordinate the stands taken by various countries, U.S. Secretary of State Baker made a lightning tour of Europe as soon as he took office. However, not much has been achieved. Over the past 40 years, NATO affairs have always been managed according to what the United States said. Now, people may pay no heed to what the United States says. One can really call this a big change.

From a historical point of view, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are products of the division of Europe into U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence immediately after the Second World War. The demarcation line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was basically in accordance with the line at which U.S. and Soviet forces met at the end of the

war. It roughly follows the Elbe. Under the pretext of containing communism and protecting the "free world," the United States used NATO and other means to put Western Europe under its control. On the other hand, under the pretext of resisting capitalism and protecting various East European countries, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact and other means to keep a firm grip on Eastern Europe. In this way, the United States and the Soviet Union consolidated the division of Europe into the two spheres of influence which they agreed on at the Yalta Conference, and the various countries in Eastern and Western Europe lost part of their independence, thus enabling the United States and the Soviet Union to act as their spokesmen in their foreign affairs and in important international affairs involving them. This is why French President De Gaulle, who could not accept this, resolutely decided to withdraw from NATO military integration and indignantly introduced the idea of "a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals." However, historical conditions were not ripe at that time, and his idea came to nothing. Now, the countries on both sides of the line separating the two blocs like the idea of a "European house" advocated by Gorbachev. This tells us that Europe has been awakened to a collective consciousness and that political trends in Europe are being reversed.

From a developmental point of view, the division of Europe into two blocs at the Yalta Conference and by the "two treaties" was not entirely a bad thing for a certain historical period. Over the past 40 years, Europe, controlled by the two superpowers, has been able to preserve peace in spite of the confrontation. This is much better than the strife and frequent wars between various European countries over the past few centuries. However, for the past few centuries there have always been external forces attempting to interfere in continental European affairs. At first, there was the British Empire, whose policy was to "draw in one group and strike at another" under the pretext of achieving "balance." Given this "balance," Europe was never able to experience peace for a single generation, but provided the setting for the two most devastating world wars in the history of mankind. The British Empire was followed by the United States. To be sure, its NATO plan and Marshall Plan have contributed positively to the stabilization and revival of Europe. However, was there not a measure of power politics in all this? Did the United States not egotistically intend to turn Western Europe into its political follower [fu shu 7096 1466], a military protective screen, and a market? When NATO was "30 years old," Europe could not really stand up. Today, when NATO is "40 years old," Europe is puzzled: Where should NATO go? Actually, the question is where Europe should go.

Now, the "problem puzzling" NATO is how to free itself from the control of the superpowers and seek a new order in Europe, so that it can keep the initiative in its hands, have independence, and carry out cooperation. Of course, a new order in Europe that is free from the

control of the United States and the Soviet Union will take a long time to evolve. However, this is a positive trend and is in keeping with the world trend toward peace and development. The peoples of the world like it. Although it is not easy to dispel the puzzlement of various West European countries, one can see that by raising this question, they have shown that they are more sober-headed than ever before.

'Roundup' Views Thatcher Diplomacy on Missiles
O'V0205031189 Beijing XINHUA in English
0111 GMT 2 May 89

["Roundup: Thatcher's Hectic Weekend Diplomacy on Missiles (by Xue Yongxing)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] London, May 1 (XINHUA)—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher failed in a round of hectic weekend diplomatics to win her argument on the necessity to keep and modernize NATO's short-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

On Sunday, Mrs. Thatcher and Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl met head-on in three hours of talks over the alliance's nuclear arms policy in the German wine town of Deidesheim.

According to British press reports, Mrs. Thatcher failed to convince Kohl of the need to modernize at once NATO's aging armory of short-range Lance nuclear missiles, mainly based on Federal German territory.

Neither did Kohl succeed to convince her that it was time for talks with the Warsaw Pact on reducing the number of nuclear missiles in Europe.

At a joint press conference held after their talks, Mrs. Thatcher insisted on the need for NATO's strategy of flexible response by updating the "absolutely vital" short-range nuclear missiles. "Obsolete weapons do not deter," she declared.

Kohl, reacting to her comments, issued a warning: Either Mrs. Thatcher accepts his opinion or she would be in danger of having a more troublesome Bonn government with which to deal after next year's federal elections.

The talks were, according to Bonn officials, "intense, full and frank."

Earlier at the weekend, Mrs. Thatcher also met Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita and her Dutch counterpart Ruud Lubbers on the missile issue, which has caused a deep rift among 16 NATO member countries before the Western alliance's 40th anniversary summit in Brussels at the end of this month.

Both her talks with De Mita and Lubbers, centered on the missile issue, lasted more than three hours.

British officials said that Mrs. Thatcher saw eye to eye with Lubbers on the issue but failed to dissuade De Mita from backing Bonn's position.

Kohl, who heads a coalition government and faces Federal elections next year, wants early East-West negotiations on reducing the number of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

With this policy, the Bonn coalition government hopes to win over voters, who now see no military threat from the Soviet Union thanks to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's peace initiatives.

In addition, the Federal German public has woken up to the unpleasant fact that NATO's strategy of flexible response makes the country the nuclear cockpit of Europe.

Mrs. Thatcher, backed by the United States, flatly opposes Kohl's call for early negotiations with the Soviet Union on the short-range nuclear missiles.

"NATO's strategy cannot be determined by any one country," she warned last week.

London and Washington fear that Bonn's call for early negotiations would be seen by Moscow as a sign of weakness and disunity in NATO's ranks.

Talks on the Lance missiles should only follow strategic, chemical and conventional arms treaties, they insisted.

According to British and U.S. sources, NATO has at present 88 Lance missiles while the Soviet Union has about 1,600 of their equivalents, most of which have been modernized over the past few years.

The West Germans want to negotiate these numbers down to an equal and lower level.

Bonn's proposal was considered utterly unacceptable by Britain and the United States as both believe that not only would it lead inevitably to a headlong slide into de-nuclearisation of Europe—thus increasing the chances of conventional war—but would also let the Russians off the negotiating hook.

The Americans want to use the missiles to persuade the Soviet Union to make huge asymmetric cuts in its tanks and artillery.

Another concern is that once deprived of battlefield nuclear cover, the U.S. Congress might start calling home the American troops based in Europe.

During a lightning visit to Washington last weekend, the Federal German foreign and defense ministers failed to convince the Bush administration of Bonn's position, but they have reportedly managed to win support from Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy and Norway.

Of other NATO countries, the Netherlands has sided with London and Washington while France and Portugal remain uncommitted.

British newspapers reported that over the next four weeks, senior ministers and officials from Britain and Federal Germany will be visiting the alliance capitals in an effort to ensure that the final statement approved in Brussels at the May 29-30 summit take their point of view into consideration.

Kohl will visit Italy to discuss the issue with De Mita on Tuesday while Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers will go to Bonn and Washington for more talks in the next two weeks.

Political observers here believe that it would now be up to other members of the Western alliance, notably the United States, to try to find a compromise to prevent a deep split, if not a crisis, over NATO's nuclear policy and its future strategy.

NORTH KOREA

Foreign Ministry Alleges Nuclear War Danger, Urges Korean NFZ

SK0305090089 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0400 GMT 3 May 89

[Foreign Ministry' "Memorandum" issued on 3 May on the increasing danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula—read by announcer]

[Text] Nuclear weapons are cruel means of war, capable of destroying our planet. The world has entered the stage of gradually reducing nuclear weapons. However, the danger of nuclear war has not been removed from the Korean peninsula, and the danger of nuclear holocaust on the Korean peninsula is greater than in any other region of the world.

Though nearly 3 years have passed since the government of the Republic put forward a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone, this has not yet been realized and, on the contrary, the danger of nuclear war has further increased. Deeming it necessary to inform the world of this situation, the DPRK Foreign Ministry is making public this memorandum.

The Korean Peninsula Has Been Under the Threat of Nuclear Weapons

The U.S. threat of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is increasing with each passing day. It has been disclosed that the "Team Spirit-89" joint military exercise was part of a plan to provoke a nuclear war in Korea. The "Team Spirit-89" joint military exercise mobilized nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, strategic bombers capable of loading nuclear weapons, nuclear missiles, various guns that can fire nuclear shells, and even "E-4B," a nuclear war commanding plane. Such a nuclear war exercise cannot but draw more serious attention in light of the fact that the use of nuclear weapons has already been attempted three times in Korea.

The Japanese magazine ASAHI JOURNAL on 6 August 1982 wrote: According to material from the U.S. CIA and the recollections of White House officials, the United States has attempted to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK three times."

The first U.S. attempt to use nuclear weapons in Korea was in the early period of the Korean war. The U.S. imperialist aggression forces, which occupied a part of the northern half of the Republic for a while, used biological and chemical weapons and attempted to even drop nuclear bombs when they were retreating because of the strong counterattack of the People's Army.

In November 1950, the then U.S. President Truman officially announced that the use of atomic bombs was under consideration. In December that year, nuclear

weapons were secretly introduced onto a U.S. aircraft carrier anchored in the sea off Inchon, and a carrier-based aircraft armed with nuclear warheads was waiting for an order to take off.

It was during the last stage of the Korean war when the Korean people nearly suffered a nuclear holocaust. Inspecting the Korean front right after he was elected U.S. President in early December 1952, Eisenhower openly made an atomic bomb threat, clamoring that action is better than negotiations.

Early in 1953, the new U.S. Administration under President Eisenhower deployed the main force of the U.S. 7th Fleet on the East and West seas of Korea to accelerate amphibious operations and, at the same time, waged a strong offensive of bombing the frontline and rear areas by mobilizing several hundred aircraft everyday. Finally, Eisenhower went so far as to issue a statement saying the United States would not hesitate to use atomic bombs in Korea.

On 30 March 1953, Eisenhower stated: If we are to take more effective action in Korea, we should expand the war beyond the boundary of Korea and use atomic bombs." On 13 May 1953, he clamored: The use of atomic weapons would be more cost-effective than the use of the conventional weapons in Korea. (U.S. Department of State secret diplomatic document on U.S. foreign relations 1953-54)

The third plan of the United States for a nuclear attack in Korea was made toward the end of the sixties.

From the day the Nixon administration took office in 1969, U.S. belligerent elements insisted on giving priority to war preparations in South Korea and further beefed up the U.S. troops occupying South Korea.

Under such an acute situation, the United States infiltrated a large reconnaissance aircraft EC-121 into our country's airspace on April 15, 1969. It was shot down through a self-defense measure by our People's Army.

Seizing this opportunity, the United States formed a mobile fleet of many ships, including battleships and an aircraft carrier, and massed it in the East Sea of Korea, while deploying reinforced forces along the Military Demarcation Line after issuing an emergency alert order to the U.S. troops occupying South Korea and the South Korean puppet army.

At that time, U.S. President Nixon called an emergency security meeting and babbled that it had been decided to sanction the use of atomic bombs if North Korea struck back. (Japanese magazine ASAHI JOURNAL, 6 August 1982)

Seeking to inflict nuclear holocaust upon the Korean people, the United States has even established a command system for the surprise use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula at any moment they choose.

The U.S. Administration has authorized the commanders of U.S. forces deployed in Asia and the Pacific to use their own judgment in pressing the button for the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, the right to use nuclear weapons in South Korea is given to the commander of the U.S. forces stationed there. In the case of Tomahawk missiles, it has been arranged so that captains can fire them using their own judgment. (Japanese magazine GENDAI, July 1984)

In this connection, former U.S. Army Chief of General Staff Meyer said that the issue of using nuclear weapons in Korea is less complicated than in the case of NATO and that their use is possible upon the on-the-spot recommendation of the commander of the field army. (South Korean daily TONG-A ILBO, 24 January 1983)

Past U.S. attempts to use nuclear weapons in Korea is part of the U.S. authorities' policy of contempt for the Asian peoples.

The August 1983 issue of the Japanese magazine MONTHLY JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY wrote that although the United States instinctively feels hesitant about using nuclear weapons against the European Caucasians, it does not feel even a moral stimulation when it comes to Asian peoples, as manifested by the nuclear attacks against Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini Island.

South Korea Is a Nuclear Storage Base

The United States shows primary interest in turning South Korea into a base from which to launch a nuclear attack according to its strategy toward Asia and the Pacific.

It was some 30 years ago that the United States began pursuing the policy of turning South Korea into a base for nuclear attacks.

On 12 February 1957, the United States conspired with the South Korean authorities to introduce nuclear weapons into South Korea. On 15 July of the same year, it officially declared that it would start arming the U.S. forces occupying South Korea with nuclear weapons. (South Korean HAPTONG yearbook, 1983 edition, p 77)

Reorganizing a U.S. Army division occupying South Korea as a (Phantomic) atomic division equipped with tactical nuclear weapons in 1957, the United States brought into South Korea an Honest John battalion and a battalion of 280 mm atomic artillery. In 1958, it brought into South Korea the 588 tactical guided missile

battalion of the U.S. Air Force and then established the 4th U.S. Army guided missile command. (AP, Washington, 15 July 1957; Seoul HAPTONG, 4 July 1958)

In the early sixties, the United States reorganized the (Phantomic) atomic division as the (Roward) atomic division and then brought into South Korea various types of atomic and guided weapons, including Nike Hercules, Matador, and Hawk guided missiles.

The United States earnestly began its policy of turning South Korea into a nuclear base after South Korea had been designated as a frontline defense area in the mid-seventies, following the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger said at a press conference on 1 May 1975 that South Korea is a frontline defense area of the United States and this means it is a zone where nuclear weapons are deployed.

More than 1,000 pieces of various nuclear weapons were already deployed at that time in South Korea. Concerning this, U.S. Congressman Ronald Dellums told Congress that the United States had introduced over 1,000 items of nuclear weapons and deployed 54 nuclear-capable aircraft in South Korea. (HAPTONG, Washington, 3 June 1975; JIJI, Washington, 20 June 1975)

Based on the policy of strength, which was more actively implemented by the Reagan administration since it came into office in the eighties, the nuclear equipment of the U.S. forces in South Korea was modernized

In the early part of the eighties, the United States supplied to the U.S. forces in South Korea 31 155-mm nuclear shells; 133 nuclear bombs for aircraft; 63 nuclear shells for the 8-inch howitzer and 21 nuclear mines, which had not been supplied to any other U.S. forces stationed overseas. (THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 May 1983)

According to official reports by the U.S. and South Korean press and publication organizations, the United States laid 21 underground nuclear mines in the area one mile south of the Military Demarcation Line. They announced that 346 tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea and Guam. (The First South Korean Radio, 2 June 1983)

In 1981 and 1982, the United States introduced various antiaircraft and antitank missiles, including 156 Stinger missiles, 70-odd improved Hawk guided missiles, and 723 rockets into South Korea. In 1983 and 1984, the United States introduced 48 F-16 fighter-bombers and 8-inch guns capable of firing neutron bombs. Furthermore, it even deployed 56 neutron bombs, known as the devilish weapons of the 20th century, for the first time in South Korea. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 May 1983)

The United States deployed Pershing-II medium-range nuclear missiles, Tomahawk missiles and ground-based cruise missiles in South Korea. (TONG-A ILBO, South Korea, 21 March 1985)

The explosive capacity of the nuclear weapons introduced and deployed in South Korea is 13,000 kilotons, or 1,000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in August 1945.

The United States systematically increased the nuclear armed forces in South Korea and established and expanded nuclear offensive bases and nuclear storage facilities. Thus, the United States has turned all of South Korea into a nuclear storehouse.

Various nuclear missiles are deployed in Tongduchon, Chunchon, and Pyongtaek in South Korea and nuclear-capable F-16 fighter-bombers are deployed in the Air Force bases in Osan and Kunsan. Various types of nuclear equipment are stored in Kwangju, and the 6171st Ammunitions Guard Unit is charged with the equipment of storing nuclear bombs. (Japanese magazine SEKAI, August 1984 issue)

The 1985 September issue of the Japanese magazine SEKAI reported that (two) battalions of M-198 155-mm howitzer are deployed in Seoul, Tongduchon, Uijongbu, Taechon, Osan, Kunsan, and Taegu and that these areas are the only zones where nuclear storehouses of the Army and Air Force are located and where F-4E aircraft, the multipurpose fighter-bombers, are deployed.

Today, South Korea, the size of about 100,000 square meters, has been turned into a complete and comprehensive nuclear offensive base filled with nuclear bombs, nuclear warheads, nuclear mines, nuclear-delivery means, and nuclear storehouses and into the largest nuclear advanced base in the Far East threatening peace and security in Asia and in the world.

Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula Is a Prerequisite for Peace and Security in the World

Today, removing nuclear weapons from South Korea and dissipating the danger of a nuclear war are very urgent issues in rescuing humankind from the nuclear danger and guaranteeing the peace and security of Asia and the world.

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons into Asia and the Korean peninsula, the DPRK Government has put forth rational proposals for their withdrawal and for preventing the danger of a nuclear war and has made all sincere efforts to put them into practice.

As early as 7 April 1959, the government of the Republic, issued a statement proposing to establish a nuclear-free peace zone in Asia, and the Workers Party of Korea

and the Japan Socialist Party in March 1981 jointly published a declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia.

In particular, the DPRK Government joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty on 12 December 1985 and, in its statement published on 23 June 1986 according to the idea of the treaty, expressed its stand to ban the testing, production, stockpile, and introduction of nuclear weapons, to disallow the establishment of all military bases, including foreign nuclear bases, and to disallow the transit of foreign nuclear weapons over Korean territory, airspace, and seas to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone.

The objective of our proposal for establishing a nuclear-free peace zone is to realize disarmament on the Korean peninsula and consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation system.

Accordingly, our proposals have earned absolute support from and have been welcomed by all Korean people and the peace-loving peoples of the world, because they are right.

The United States, as a trustee of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, should respond to the proposal for establishing a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula according to the commitment of the treaty.

As is acknowledged by the world, those countries that possess nuclear weapons are obligated to take steps against threatening or attacking with nuclear weapons those countries that have no nuclear weapons.

The United States, by lending an ear to the ever-growing voices of the anti-war and anti-nuclear peace movements of the peoples at home and abroad, should not continue to persist in conducting nuclear war provocation maneuvers any longer, should withdraw the nuclear weapons and all other aggressive armed forces that it has brought into South Korea, and should do away with nuclear war exercises such as "Team Spirit."

Today, the INF Treaty has been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States and has now entered the stage of implementation, while the issue of abolishing tactical nuclear weapons has been placed on the agenda.

Accordingly, the U.S. authorities now have no reason whatsoever to continue the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea, because the nuclear weapons deployed there target other socialist countries as well.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union, along with other major powers in the region, has expressed its willingness to guarantee the nuclear-free (status) if a nuclear-free zone is established on the Korean peninsula.

Under these circumstances, the United States also should take a corresponding step of guarantee at an early date.

The persons in authority in South Korea should not seek a permanent office under the protection of the nuclear umbrella of their masters and should not offer South Korea as a U.S. nuclear forward base.

The United States and the persons in authority in South Korea should come forth at an early date to respond to the call for tripartite talks to realize the phased reduction of arms, including nuclear weapons, on the Korean peninsula, to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, and to adopt a declaration of nonaggression between the North and South.

Today, the peaceful settlement of conflicts is being sought in all continents on the globe, disarmament talks are under way, and nuclear disarmament is being pursued.

The DPRK Government, by pooling strength with peace-loving countries of the world, will make all efforts to actively contribute to turning the Korean peninsula and northeast Asia into a nuclear-free peace zone and to realizing overall and complete disarmament on a global scale.

[Dated] 3 May 1989, Pyongyang

SOUTH KOREA

Lawmaker Calls Nuclear Arms 'Greatest Enemy'
41070110 Seoul WOLGAN KUNSA PIJON in Korean
Jan 89 pp 36-40

[Article by Representative Cho Yun-hyong, chairman of the National Assembly Defense Committee: "Our Greatest Enemy Is None Other Than Nuclear Weapons"]

[Excerpts] The reason we examine the proposals for disarmament between the Eastern and Western camps is that the disarmament issue, the nuclear weapons issue in particular, has a direct bearing on the Korean question. Another reason is that the climate in the international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula is rapidly changing in favor of peace. Many critics point out that amid this atmosphere, military tension is not mounting anywhere else but on the Korean peninsula, where evil arms (nuclear weapons) are stockpiled in locations scattered around the country. [passage omitted]

Even Defense Minister Kept in the Dark

In dealing with the question of whether nuclear weapons exist or not, the U.S. and ROK Governments have adhered to secrecy as their standard policy.

The answer given by the then defense minister, Chong Ho-yong, in the 12th National Assembly is a typical example. Responding to a question at a National Assembly Defense Committee meeting, Defense Minister Chong equivocated by saying, "We can neither say that

nuclear weapons exist nor that no nuclear weapons exist." In other words, it is government policy that even the defense minister can neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

However, in the current 13th National Assembly, the government has shown a somewhat different attitude. Answering a question during the 13th National Assembly's parliamentary inspection of government operations involving the Defense Ministry, Defense Minister O Cha-pok said that "we will see to it that our government is consulted in case nuclear weapons are to be used." Needless to say, what he said does not mean that the government intends to abandon the secrecy doctrine concerning the presence of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the statement of Defense Minister O can be construed as admitting the presence of nuclear weapons, a move one step forward from the same old attitude of neither conforming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.

Why, then, is the ROK Government unable to take an independent stand concerning nuclear weapons? Peter Hays, an Australian military expert, explained the reason in his book entitled "American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea." [book title given in English]. "The ROK Government, although it is charged with the role of supporting U.S. nuclear weapons, has no information about the number, types, and locations of these weapons which are deployed in South Korea or which the United States intends to use, if necessary. According to a high-ranking American military authority, the ROK Government does not even know whether an ROK-U.S. joint nuclear war plan exists or not." (Interviews with high-ranking U.S. military authorities in April, May, and June 1987.) Peter Hays then explained why:

"In order for the two countries to share information, it becomes necessary to exchange information on American nuclear technology and procedures. But the United States can not ask the ROK Government to prepare a program on the reliability of ROK personnel engaged in nuclear support operations. Such a request, in fact, requires approval of the U.S. Congress, so the U.S. Forces in the ROK cannot take any action unless and until the U.S. Congress approves a program of cooperation (POC).

These remarks of Peter Hays affirm that the ROK Government has no sovereign right as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. Let me reiterate that despite the fact that an enormously large number of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the Korean peninsula several times over are stockpiled in various locations throughout the South, the ROK Government has no way of knowing the number, types, and locations of these nuclear weapons until a POC is established. This means that the very survival of the Korean nation is mortgaged to the United

States. This dumbfounds us because despite the fact that a huge number of nuclear weapons have been brought into our country, we are not able to share information on these nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons and the Korean Peninsula

More than 30 years have passed since the deployment of nuclear weapons in the ROK was officially announced for the first time. On 28 January 1958, the United Nations Command in the ROK formally announced that "nuclear weapons have been introduced into the ROK," and for the first time on 3 February [1958], displayed a 280-mm atomic gun and an Honest John surface-to-surface missile, to the public. Since then the figures that have been given by various sources concerning nuclear weapons stored by the U.S. Forces in Korea vary widely between 100 or more, at the least, and 1,000 or more, at the most.

The types of nuclear weapons currently stored in the ROK include neutron bombs, which the U.S. military proudly calls "clean bombs" capable of killing humans without destroying buildings (these bombs can be fired by recently introduced Lance missiles); tactical nuclear weapons (nuclear shells and nuclear mines); theater nuclear weapons which fall midway between these tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.

Needless to say, in the absence of public announcements giving objective information on nuclear weapons, the magnitude of the combined destructive power of all nuclear weapons stored in South Korea has not been made known. However, they are presumed to have a destructive power equivalent to more than 1,000 atomic bombs of the type (14,000 tons of TNT) dropped over Hiroshima.

The numbers given by different sources on nuclear weapons existing in the ROK may be divided into the following two groups:

- More than 1,000: U.S. Congressman Ronald Williams, May 1975; Japanese military affairs journal GUNJI MINRON, No 27, 1982; THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 1987
- 600 to 700: Japanese MAINICHI SHIMBUN, May 1977; the U.S. Intelligence Center, 1976; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, May 1978; nuclear expert Gregory Henderson, July 1988.

The types of major nuclear weapons reportedly possessed by the U.S. Forces in Korea are as follows:

- The B-61 air-dropped strategic and tactical bomb: Deliverable by F-4 and F-16 fighters, 380 kg in weight, an explosive power of 100-500 kilotons [kt]
- The Honest John surface-to-surface missile: Capable of firing nuclear warheads with an explosive power of 1 to 60 kt

- The Lance surface-to-surface tactical missile: a mobile missile with a range of 120 km, capable of firing a 1-100 kt warhead
- The 155-mm shell: an explosive power of 0.1 kt.

The ROK is known as the only place in the Far East where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed under the U.S. Northeast Asian strategy. In his book, Peter Hays says that there are 19 nuclear bases in South Korea, including Kunsan, Osan, Kwangju, and Taegu. Kwangju and Osan are known as nuclear air force bases and nuclear bomb depots, and Kwangju and Taegu as nuclear weapons storage management bases.

This fact was confirmed in July 1986 from the record of the closed-door hearings at the Armed Services Subcommittee of the U.S. House Appropriation Committee and was also brought to light by various remarks concerning the use of nuclear weapons.

Recently, when the author met General Cushman, former commander in chief of I Corps, U.S. Forces in Korea, at his breakfast meeting with PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy] parliamentarians, he said: "There is no need for nuclear weapons in Korea. Joint ROK-U.S. operation is sufficient to beat back North Korea." Thus he indirectly intimated that nuclear weapons exist in the ROK. The American general was visiting South Korea to attend a seminar sponsored by the Defense Research Institute under the title "The Direction of Development in ROK-U.S. Security Relations." Under the circumstances in which the fear of nuclear war is approaching ever closer to reality with each passing day, only the United States is sticking to a nuclear weapons strategy based on its own national interests.

Since the 15 April 1983 ROK-U.S. security consultation session, the United States has defined the ROK as an area which has the highest strategic value and which is of vital importance to the United States. According to this definition, the United States has stepped up the annual "Team Spirit" military exercise. Operation "Team Spirit" in particular is widely known as a comprehensive military exercise based on the possibility of a nuclear war. Military experts unanimously point out that this is borne out by the fact that the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway joins in this exercise from overseas; also a part of the exercise are the F-111 Air Wing, the main nuclear strike force of the U.S. Air Force, from the Continental United States; B-52 strategic bombers flying from Guam, and the 25th Infantry Division, all nuclear-armed units. Since limited nuclear warfare and war sustainability were emphasized in 1983, the concept of Air-Land Battle, [preceding three words in English] the tactical line of the U.S. Forces, has been the center of the "Team Spirit" exercise. The U.S. Army field manual 100-5 provides that "the enemy should be thrown off balance by a strong strike unleashed from an unexpected direction and this should be followed up with a continuing

rapid attack in order to prevent the enemy from recovery." The doctrine of Air-Land Battle is in essence a "preemptive nuclear strike strategy." Therefore, we can clearly assert that should a nuclear war break out, the Korean peninsula, it is almost certain, would suffer the greatest loss under the U.S. Northeast Asian nuclear strategy; hundreds of thousands of civilians would be sacrificed.

Information on Nuclear Weapons Should Be Made Public

According to 6 September newspaper reports, "the United States, in return for agreeing to the ROK request for extension of the ROK-U.S. Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement which is due to expire at the end of October, is pressing the ROK for protection of American military patent secrets." The problem is that these military patent secrets are drawing attention because it has been learned that they include more than 100 nuclear-related technologies. A government source has expressed his misgivings saying, "We are worried because we do not know what the contents of the 350 military patents in the hands of the United States are." This is a development indicative of a recent effort on the part of the United States to conceal information on nuclear weapons by using the extension of the scientific and technological cooperation agreement as a cover. Under these circumstances, using various ROK-U.S. military agreements, the ROK is kept completely in the dark when it comes to the presence of nuclear weapons which threatens the survival of the Korean nation.

In the opinion of the author, we cannot say we have sovereign rights if the U.S. Government, despite the fact that it has nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK which involve the survival of the Korean people, cannot provide the ROK with pertinent information until it obtains U.S. Congressional approval. Therefore, in my remarks in the National Assembly, I have stressed that when any measure is taken with regard to the deployment, transportation, storage, and production of nuclear weapons and information thereon, such a measure should require National Assembly approval. In view of the fact that unlike NATO, nuclear weapons in the ROK are being handled without the public's knowledge, the author demands that the handling of nuclear weapons be subject to approval of the National Assembly, which represents the people. Nuclear weapons cannot be placed above the law.

In conclusion, the author wants to recapitulate on this occasion my remarks made at the National Assembly.

First, these questions arise in case nuclear arms are to be used: What kinds of consultations are conducted? Through what channel is our government informed? Who is the highest authority to permit the use of nuclear weapons?

Second, the government should notify the public by various media of information concerning nuclear weapons. Information on the types, number, location, and capacity of nuclear weapons should be made public completely. The military authorities are obliged to inform the public through their public information service, and the public has the right to know.

With an antinuclear bill introduced in the Philippine parliament a few months ago, public opinion against nuclear war has been aroused. As a member of the National Assembly Defense Committee, I am watching the worldwide antinuclear movement with great interest and am of the opinion that we should strongly push for the enactment of "antinuclear legislation" particularly in our country. I believe that through the concerted efforts of our people, we should put an end to the current military situation in which the right of survival of our nation is in the hands of an unknown U.S. soldier. The government and the National Assembly alike should do away with the same old cold war doctrine they have applied to the nuclear weapons issue up until now.

NEW ZEALAND

Prime Minister Reaffirms Stand on ANZUS

'ANZUS-Is-Dead' Comment

*BK2904092689 Melbourne Overseas Service in English
0800 GMT 29 Apr 89*

[Text] New Zealand's prime minister, Mr Lange, has said he stands firm behind his controversial ANZUS [Australian, New Zealand, United States] speech at Yale University in the United States claiming it represented the view of the majority of New Zealanders.

Mr Lange was equally insistent that sufficient consultation had taken place before he delivered his ANZUS-is-dead comment. He told a news conference in his first public comment since returning to the political row that has brewed in the wake of his North American visit that it was a considered speech to forge a new relationship with the United States.

Mr Lange also rejected allegations that he had not adequately consulted New Zealand's closest ally—Australia.

Opposition Views Lange's Speech

*BK0305072489 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND
HERALD in English 27 Apr 89 p 5*

[From Tim Murphy in Wellington]

[Text] Government ministers told Parliament yesterday that suggestions by the Prime Minister, Mr Lange, that New Zealand might withdraw from the ANZUS council did not mean the alliance was at an end.

In a snap debate forced by the Opposition, the Acting Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, claimed the Yale University speech contained "not a great deal that is new."

He said Mr Lange had faced up to the fact that there was an impasse, and had offered "very positive" views of a more constructive relationship in the future with the United States.

Mr Palmer considered Mr Lange's reference to ANZUS being a "dead letter" was no more than terms used by the former United States Secretary of State Mr Shultz.

The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Bolger, wondered if the Prime Minister had been inspired to drop his ANZUS bombshell by his visit to Strawberry Fields in New York with Yoko Ono, the widow of Beatle John Lennon.

The Opposition regarded Mr Lange's speech as a "stab in the dark to shore up the party's left."

Mr Bolger told the House Mr Lange had in December 1987 dismissed the prospect of Australia being a substitute for the United States in defence of this country. The Prime Minister had said at the time that such a position was "quite alarmingly bizarre."

National [opposition party] believed the Government was wrong to claim there could be no accommodation for a nuclear-free policy under the ANZUS umbrella.

"Every other country has been able to reach an understanding. All have an equal abhorrence to the possibility of nuclear war or nuclear disaster."

Mr Palmer said Mr Bolger wanted to rebuild the alliance if in power, but would not say how he could reconcile the nuclear-free policy to ANZUS. "It cannot be done, because ANZUS is a nuclear alliance."

He said National wanted to be able to turn a blind eye to American ships carrying nuclear missiles calling at New Zealand ports.

"Nothing could be further from an effective political policy," he said.

"There is one thing New Zealanders are absolutely clear about and that is that New Zealand must remain, should remain and will remain nuclear free."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Marshall, said Mr Lange was offering the United States the chance to improve relations. Bilateral consultation had been so poor that New Zealand was in a worse position than even the worst depths of the Rainbow Warrior affair had produced with France.

Mr Marshall said the Yale speech had been "rounded and statesmanlike." He regretted that the possibility of formal notice of withdrawal from the ANZUS council had been given such great attention while Mr Lange had canvassed improvements to the countries' relationship.

But Opposition speakers rejected the ministers' claims that the suggested withdrawal from the council would not remove New Zealand from the alliance itself.

Mr Bolger said such a view qualified Mr Lange for becoming the founding president of the Strategic Flat Earth Society.

A former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon Warren Cooper (Oppn-Otago), said the Prime Minister had raised the possibility of withdrawal as a "gigantic red herring."

"It is the type of speech you make when at home you are in a desperate situation."

Lange Said To Risk Leadership

BK0305071689 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND
HERALD in English 27 Apr 89 p 1

[By Simon Collins, Wellington political editor]

[Text] The Prime Minister, Mr Lange, has put his leadership of the Labour Party on the line again after surprising his ministers by publicly suggesting New Zealand's withdrawal from the ANZUS Council.

Labour caucus sources said last night that the mood was hardening against Mr Lange in the wake of polls showing that Labour will lose the next election unless it achieves a reconciliation with the former Minister of Finance, the Hon Roger Douglas.

Mr Lange's speech in the United States, raising the prospect of a formal withdrawal from the council of the alliance with the United States and Australia, has contributed to MPs' doubts about his willingness to consult on major policy issues.

Many MPs were embarrassed by attending ANZAC [Australia and New Zealand Army Corps] Day ceremonies without warning of what Mr Lange was saying at the same time.

He had told senior ministers informally during the past few weeks that the Government would have to address the issue of giving formal notice of withdrawal.

He had also made what one MP described as "a veiled reference" to the issue at a full caucus meeting a fortnight ago.

But soundings last night did not yield a single MP who knew beforehand that Mr Lange planned to address the issue as strongly as he did during his North American visit.

The affair took a new twist early today when Mr Lange issued a statement in Ottawa, saying that advance copies of his speech were circulated to key ministers and all ministerial press secretaries on Monday afternoon.

Douglas supporters believe the mood in the caucus is shifting increasingly to the point where, if it has to choose between Mr Lange's leadership and bringing Mr Douglas back into the cabinet, it will be willing to see Mr Lange go.

One senior minister said Mr Lange clearly found it more comfortable without the intellectual rigour of Mr Douglas and the MP for Auckland Central, the Hon Richard Prebble, around the cabinet table.

But he said the result of "lazy" thinking was the kind of surprise which Mr Lange sprang on his colleagues on Tuesday.

Bush Administration Called 'Uncivilized'

BK0405021289 Hong Kong AFP in English 0142 GMT
4 May 89

[Text] Wellington, May 4 (AFP)—New Zealand Foreign Minister Russell Marshall has said the administration of U.S. President George Bush was uncivilised in its behaviour towards politicians from other countries.

Speaking in Parliament late Wednesday during a debate on the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] defence alliance, Mr. Marshall said the administration's refusal to talk with New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange during his visit last week to the United States was "not acceptable behaviour".

New Zealand's involvement in the ANZUS defence alliance, which includes Australia and the United States, was effectively ended in 1984, following the election of Mr. Lange's labour government on an anti-nuclear stance and the banning of U.S. nuclear-equipped warships from the country's ports.

In a speech at Yale University last week, Mr. Lange canvassed the option of a formal New Zealand withdrawal from the alliance, describing it as a "dead letter" because of U.S. objections to his anti-nuclear policies.

While Mr. Lange was being snubbed, administration officials were last week holding talks with Don McKinnon, deputy leader of the conservative National Party opposition.

Mr. Marshall said no other country in the world would receive opposition members of Parliament while refusing to see government ministers from a friendly nation.

"There is only one place where, sadly, and I say this with regret, the administration does not yet know how to behave in a civilised way so far as politicians from another country are concerned," he said.

"We would not treat people like that. Governments do not normally behave like that," he added.

Mr. Marshall said he had expressed his views to Paul Cleveland, the retiring U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand. "I have told Mr. Cleveland I regard that as not acceptable behaviour," he said.

Even at the height of the differences between New Zealand and France over the 1985 bombing of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow Warrior" in Auckland by French secret service agents, access was maintained at all levels with the French Government, he said.

'Bitter Feuding' in Labour Party

BK0105135189 Hong Kong AFP in English 1332 GMT
1 May 89

[By Suzanne Pollard]

[Excerpt] Wellington, May 1 (AFP)—Premier David Lange moved Monday to restore public and business confidence as bitter feuding continued to split the Labour Party and money markets reacted nervously to speculation of a leadership coup.

While acknowledging the existence of a campaign to undermine his leadership, Mr. Lange told a press conference that there had been no leadership challenge and said he was satisfied with the loyalty of his ministers.

"The ground hasn't shifted in New Zealand politics," he said after a cabinet meeting, adding: "I'm here, I'm going to remain here."

Amid fears about the stability of the government's free-market economic policies and Mr. Lange's future, the New Zealand dollar drifted up in nervous trading to close Monday at 61.72 U.S. cents from Friday's 61.55 cents finish and the government stock futures market was hard hit.

Mr. Lange returned here at the weekend from a trip to the United States where he caused a political row after declaring last Tuesday at Yale University that the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] defence alliance was a "dead letter" because of U.S. objections to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policies.

Before trying to quell the warfare that broke out between the left and right wings of the Labour Party's Auckland division at their annual conference over the weekend, he had to face up Monday to criticism from some ministers who were angry at not knowing details of the "dead letter" speech before its delivery.

He also had to deal with public and party concerns about his being pictured on the cover of the latest edition of TIME magazine lying casually-clad in a field of grass at a time when his party was self-destructing in front of him.

The photograph had been taken 18 months ago for a travel and leisure magazine, Mr. Lange explained, while criticising its use by the news weekly as "fundamentally dishonest."

Communications problems on a public holiday were cited as the reason for his ministers' ignorance on the

ANZUS speech. The five-year rift over ANZUS—a defence alliance grouping the United States, New Zealand and Australia—stems from Wellington's ports ban on visiting U.S. nuclear-equipped warships.

Mr. Lange said concern within the cabinet about the speech had abated after it had been analysed and the "communication problems" explained. "I'm totally satisfied I did absolutely nothing wrong," he said. [passage omitted]

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff on 'Objections' to SNF Modernization

PM2504150689 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD
in Dutch 20 Apr 89 p 5

[Article by General Petr Lushev, Soviet deputy defense minister and Warsaw Pact commander in chief: "The Warsaw Pact's Objections to Short-Range Nuclear Forces"—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] While the NATO nuclear planning group is turning its attention in Brussels to the modernization of short-range nuclear arms, General Petr Lushev, Soviet deputy defense minister and Warsaw Pact commander in chief, again outlines Moscow's criticism of these plans. In an article that he sent to this newspaper, he emphasizes the possible repercussions that such modernization could have on the talks on conventional forces reductions in Europe.

Petr Lushev, Warsaw Pact commander in chief:

The Warsaw Pact member states have adopted measures limiting their troop strength and their military spending. The socialist countries decided to make unilateral cuts in their combat forces, conventional arms, and military spending without any agreement or negotiations with their opposite numbers in NATO. This was no proposal but rather an initiative. This is thus all the more reason not to view it as something that was decided under pressure or as a result of an ultimatum from one country or a group of countries. Because the NATO alliance has reached a point at which it realizes that it is necessary to reach agreement on collective measures to guarantee the security of the European Continent, we would be full of praise if it were to take analogous steps and to reduce its armaments in the fields where it has superiority.

With their unilateral measures, the socialist countries made a start in implementing the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency. This means that combat forces now find themselves in a new and very important phase of their development. In this phase they are being restructured and giving concrete form to a number of principles contained in their military doctrine. As a result the Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe and the combat forces of the Warsaw Pact will have assumed a purely defensive posture before 1991.

It is not impossible that in the future the Warsaw Pact could initiate further unilateral disarmament initiatives. However, if we are considering such things, we have to take a large number of factors into account. The most important of these is probably the behavior of the NATO alliance.

In the present situation the socialist countries cannot of course contemplate any new unilateral disarmament initiatives. They would perhaps have gone further if they had had more practical indications that NATO, too, is prepared to take analogous steps. However, NATO seems to be more concerned about long-term plans aiming at compensation and modernization.

At the CFE negotiations in Vienna, we are proposing reductions in combat forces on the continent in three stages down to a level sufficient for defense.

First stage: This will take 2 to 3 years. Both sides eliminate imbalances and asymmetries, both in troop strengths and in the most important categories of weapons. Here special attention should be paid to the most destabilizing types of weapons. Military activities must then be limited, and tactical nuclear arms must be set aside.

Second stage: This will also take 2 to 3 years. In this stage a number of percentage reductions will be implemented starting at the level existing after stage one. It is proposed that around 500,000 men and certain arms categories will disappear on both sides. At the same time steps would be taken to restructure according to the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency.

Third stage: The armies would then have a purely defensive character and limits would be set on all other types of weapons. Agreements would also be reached on the organizational principles of combat forces to which the NATO and the Warsaw Pact member states would have to adhere.

As the course of the negotiations in Vienna show, the vision of the negotiators coincides on a number of points. This applies above all to a number of aspects which I have already illustrated. This permits us to hope that the negotiations will conclude well, notwithstanding the difficulties and the complicated situation. Meanwhile, the tactical nuclear arms in Western Europe that NATO wants to modernize are not up for discussion.

The fact that on one of the two sides one or another type of nuclear weapon is deployed means that the other side pays special attention to the intentions for and the possible use of those weapons. As a result, a very unstable situation arises, which could again stimulate the nuclear arms race and cause international relations to deteriorate.

The NATO alliance's plans to modernize tactical nuclear arms have a catalyzing effect here. If these ideas become reality, then the whole of the positive evolution we now are seeing in Europe will again collapse. We would then again find ourselves living in the situation that preceded the INF Treaty. The Warsaw Pact member states do not want this. That is why there must be talks on this subject.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. Stance on Missile Modernization Criticized

AU0205111889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 27 Apr 89 p 2

["W.M." editorial: "The United States, Its Allies, and 'Modernization'"]

[Text] The statements by President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney are unambiguous: If the new U.S. Administration has its way, there will be no negotiations on a third zero-option. On the contrary, Washington wants to replace the Lance missiles deployed in the FRG with missiles having a range four times greater at any cost by using the excuse of "modernization." Currently U.S. troops are again holding exercises with Pershing II missiles, which have to be abolished in line with the INF Treaty. Does the United States want to turn the disarmament process, which was started with the elimination of the intermediate-range missiles, into a new arms race? In view of the 1990 Bundestag elections, the FRG Government intends to decide on these missiles only in 1992. And it is in favor of accepting the Warsaw Pact states' offer to hold negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons.

These standpoints were reaffirmed on the occasion of the visit of Bonn Ministers Genscher and Stoltenberg to Washington at the beginning of this week. The United States noted that the talks have not brought about greater flexibility of the rigid fronts. The FRG foreign minister announced that it is intended to try to come to agreement on this issue before the NATO summit at the end of May.

In fact, this session of the Western alliance will not be able to avoid the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. There are not only differences of opinion between Washington and Bonn. While the U.S. position is shared by Great Britain, most European NATO countries support Bonn's standpoint. Or they are in favor of not only starting negotiations but, in addition, also of an early agreement on a third zero-option with the Warsaw Pact states. The closer the countries are to the dividing line between the two military alliances, the more decisively these countries' citizens are in favor of eliminating all nuclear weapons; this has to be taken into account by the governments.

A compromise between the anachronistic strategy of deterrence and its potential disastrous consequences is not feasible. True security, also for the NATO states, is only possible by comprehensively eliminating military confrontation—by means of further disarmament steps in all fields, up to tactical nuclear weapons, on which there have been no negotiations so far. As is known, precisely on this issue the Warsaw Pact has made a constructive proposal to NATO, which includes the

possibility of a step-by-step elimination of these weapons. Of course, separate negotiations on this problem are to be put into the context of results at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments.

Thus, the NATO summit will have to provide clear answers to the question of whether the nuclear disarmament process, which started with the elimination of the intermediate-range missiles, is to be expanded or is to be canceled by the "modernization" of the Lance missiles that are deployed in the FRG. Will the FRG follow its obligation to do everything so that war will never again start from German soil? And also the desire of the large majority of the FRG citizens to eliminate these hellish devices?

Defense Minister Kessler Addresses Christian Forum on Defense Policy

LD0105085789 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1354 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Service in the GDR Armed Forces as service for peace and the well-being of mankind is in accordance with the ethical values that Christians allow themselves to be guided by in their social behavior. This thought characterized roundtable talks in Berlin today [26 April] on peace and defense policy by Christians from all parts of the country with Army General Heinz Kessler, GDR defense minister.

According to the minister, in assessing the military political situation one has to start from two basic tendencies: from the tendency, gaining in ground, toward detente in international relations, toward disarmament and peaceful cooperation, and from the opposite tendency, the increasing resistance of those reactionary and militaristic forces whose plans do not include disarmament.

The decisive impetus for such positive steps as the INF Treaty and the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe came and come from the Soviet Union and from the socialist states, not least from activities and initiatives by the GDR, Minister Kessler stated. In this direction the main concern is not to allow the disarmament and detente process which has gotten off the ground to stop and to accelerate its dynamism. The unilateral disarmament steps announced during the last few months and those already introduced show especially how serious the Warsaw Pact states are in this. However, these disarmament and detente initiatives are still meeting with little desire for a positive response.

NATO adheres to the so-called dual concept of armament and negotiation, and thus to the intention of carrying out negotiations with socialist countries only from the basis of military strength, said Kessler. The principle of so-called "nuclear deterrence" was emphasized, or more exactly, the forcing of political concessions through the threat of nuclear weapons.

NATO and its strongest member states, including the FRG, which, while possessing no nuclear weapons itself, has sufficient carriers, consider nuclear weapons to be fundamentally indispensable. NATO's concept of military strategy agreed upon in 1967-68 also remain valid. This strategy of so-called "flexible response" and "forward defense" might be made to appear defensive, but is clearly offensive, the minister noted. Clear proof of this is offered, in particular, by the operational procedures, developed a few years ago, of "deep strike" for the U.S. and NATO armed forces in Europe. These provide for the preparation and execution of surprise attacks with nuclear weapons or with nonnuclear precision weapons on important targets in the entire depth of the Warsaw Pact defense.

The army general referred, in this context, to the clear contradiction between declarations of disarmament and the intentions of producing and stationing new nuclear weapons in Europe. This is all taking place against the backdrop of intensified propaganda against the forces for peace from all social strata, against the GDR and other socialist countries, and goes hand in hand with provocative interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It must be seen in direct relation to the increasingly apparent and frequent revanchist demands.

The minister expressed concern over the growing neo-Nazism in the FRG and in west Berlin. This must be nipped in the bud. Fascism must never develop again on German soil.

The Soviet Union, the GDR, and all Warsaw Pact states have made the commitment not to start any war, nuclear or conventional, and to protect our peoples and states from every type of imperialist aggression. Therefore, too, on the path from arms limitation and disarmament a state of the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on an increasingly low level is being striven for, the minister explained further. The military doctrine of the GDR is based likewise on these common principles as the doctrine of the other socialist states of the Warsaw Pact.

Numerous Christian citizens, many of them members of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have to bear coresponsibility in all spheres of socialist society in the GDR as well as in national defense and important tasks and obligations rest on their shoulders, the defense minister stated. He recalled a CDU military policy session where it was ascertained that the protection of peace is not solely a matter for the Armed Forces but a matter for every citizen of the country. These thoughts determine the behavior of thousands of CDU members. The state and Army leadership value their contribution very highly and also comply with each citizen with religious affiliations—whether a member of this or whatever religious community—who wished to avoid service with weapons. Of course, the state, or society, cannot completely exempt anyone from performing his constitutional obligation.

The employment of construction soldiers, sappers, and temporarily, those soldiers liable for military service from regiments in the national economy will contribute—as the reduction of Armed Forces by 10,000 men and the cutting of defense expenditure by 10 percent—to the successful continuation of economic and social parties and thus to the economic and political strengthening of the GDR, Defense Minister Kessler continued. He expressed the hope that all these steps taken by the GDR and its allies will make the peace forces in the NATO states, and by name, in the FRG all the more determined to lead their governments to copy such laudable actions, such concrete steps on the path to arms limitation and disarmament into a nuclear weapons free world and in general into a future without war or the danger of war.

Church circles inside and outside the GDR have repeatedly expressed the hope that unilateral steps will give clear impetus to the disarmament efforts, and that—as was stated in corresponding declarations—greater transparency will be created in questions of military force ratios. This was stressed by CDU Chairman Gerald Goetting during the talk. From now on, everyone can recognize more clearly than before on which side there is a serious determination to reduce armaments and armed forces, to continuously disarm, and to prevent a war.

We know that the dangers to peace and security are not yet removed, Goetting explained. We are working to ensure that the powers of reason and of realism can make further progress. At the same time—and because of this—we remain alert and ready for defensive action. We Christian Democrats know that such military service in socialism can help to defend peace. The CDU is right to propose that young people, who for reasons of conscience feel that they must refuse military service, should have the opportunity to fulfill their civic duty honorably in order to strengthen the GDR and its defense capability, in construction units. This arrangement has proved its value, the party chairman explained.

Military service in socialism is indispensable service for peace. The readiness to reinforce socialism and peace necessarily includes the readiness to defend socialism and peace, said Goetting. This is an inseparable part of the responsibility the state and its citizens bear so that peace may be maintained. The Christian Democrats will continue in the future to act according to this conviction.

Defense Minister Speaks at Party College
AU2404205289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 21 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—On Thursday [20 April] at the "Karl Marx" Party College of the Central Committee, Army General Heinz Kessler, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and minister of national defense, spoke about trends in the international military-political situation and on the implementation of the

military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states and related problems of GDR national defense. He thus opened the 20th lecture series in the military-political cycle of the institute.

Army Gen Heinz Kessler proceeded from the statement made by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee at the seventh Central Committee session, that the trend toward detente, disarmament, and peaceful cooperation is determining international relations. This, however is countered by the intensifying resistance of the most reactionary forces of imperialism. The decisive stimuli for the positive international steps emanate from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, and not least from the activities and the initiatives of the GDR, he stressed. "It is our main concern in this respect not to let the initiated process of disarmament and detente stop, but to further accelerate its dynamism."

How serious the Warsaw Pact is about this is shown by the unilateral disarmament steps announced and already initiated over the past few months and the restructuring of its Armed Forces, while developing their defensive character even more strongly. "In the interest of bringing about further binding treaties, the socialist states are making important advance moves, which are unprecedented in the century-old history of the struggle for disarmament—this must also be noted with attention in the states with a capitalist social system." It is all the more strange that word and deed of some NATO member states do not coincide in some questions of peace, detente, and disarmament, and that they are, much more, trying to push ahead their own armament and to achieve military superiority.

The GDR party and state leadership has always taken care that everything necessary for the armed protection of socialism has been done, Heinz Kessler continued. "A continuous military policy of the socialist German state, which is oriented toward the protective and security interests of our people and our defensive community, is therefore an inseparable and important element of the successful balance sheet that we are drawing up in the 40th year of the GDR."

Physicians' Peace Organization Discusses Tasks

AU2504105189 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 21 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] Frankfurt/Oder (ADN)—The discontinuation of all nuclear tests and a ban on nuclear weapons remain the chief concerns of the GDR section of the organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). To this end, the physicians in the republic would support every reasonable step in the disarmament process. This was stated by Professor Moritz Mebel, chairman of the GDR section of IPPNW at a public meeting of the plenum of this section in Frankfurt/Oder on Thursday [20 April]. He paid tribute

to the many actions of physicians and students against the danger of nuclear war, that are increasingly marked by the close cooperation with many social forces in towns and villages. In the scope of "Cease-fire 89," a worldwide campaign mounted by IPPNW for the discontinuation of nuclear tests, events were held in all bezirks, at which the urgency of this measure was stressed. Thereby, the 8,000 GDR members have actively joined preparations for the ninth IPPNW world congress to be held in Hiroshima in October.

Academy member Professor Karl Friedrich Alexander expressed to the plenum the agreement of the "GDR Committee for Scientific Problems of Ensuring Peace and Disarmament" at the GDR Academy of Sciences to set up a test ban coalition. He warned about the development of new weapons in West Europe and the United States.

POLAND

Defense Minister Chairs Discussion on Spending Cuts, Restructuring

LD2204210589 Warsaw PAP in English
1934 GMT 22 Apr 89

[Text] Warsaw, April 22—The 14th central debate on proper management in the Armed Forces in Poland was held here Saturday. It was chaired by PUWP CC [Polish United Workers Party Central Committee] Political Bureau member and National Defence Minister Gen. Florian Siwicki.

An introductory report was delivered by National Defence Vice-Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Gen. Jozef Uzycki.

The debate assessed the hitherto implementation of tasks concerning the more rational management of the army, and exchanged experiences and views on the ways and methods of economizing with the simultaneous fulfilling of defence tasks. It also discussed socio-economic conditions affecting the armed force in the near future.

In 1987, instead of going up as it was planned, the real expenditures of the national Defence Ministry went down by 2.9 per cent against the 1986 figures. Similar decisions, aimed to reduce burden laid on the national economy by military expenditures, were implemented over the subsequent years to make it possible to cut the Defence Ministry's budget by a total of 14 per cent this year as compared with 1986 when the previous debate on rational management took place.

Much attention was paid to the restructuring of the armed forces on the basis of the principle of indispensable defence sufficiency, and to austerity measures possible to be introduced in the conditions of cuts in the number of soldiers and when quantity is being replaced with higher quality.

BRAZIL

Sonda-IV Rocket Successfully Launched

PY2904134689 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 29 Apr 89

[Text] The Aeronautics Ministry yesterday successfully launched the Sonda-IV rocket, which is built in Brazil.

The Sonda-IV rocket was launched to test elements that will be used in the satellite launching vehicle (VSL). Experts at the Barreira do Inferno launch center said the launch surpassed all expectations.

This is the first time the hot system to separate the two stages of the rocket has been employed. This system improved the rocket's trajectory.

Space Agency To Test-Launch VLS Rocket 16 May

PY0305025689 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2200 GMT 2 May 89

[Text] Technicians from the Barreira do Inferno Launch Center in Rio Grande do Norte have begun preparations to launch a new rocket. The rocket is a reduced model of the Satellite Launching Vehicle, VLS, that is being developed by the Institute of Space Activities of the Sao Jose dos Campos Aerospace Technical Center.

The 16 May test launching is the second one with a 30-percent-reduced model. The VLS will be used to launch Brazilian satellites, and the first full-size test is scheduled for 1992 at Alcantara Center, in Maranhao State.

AFGHANISTAN

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denies Use of Chemical Weapons

LD0405185989 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari
1600 GMT 4 May 89

[Foreign Ministry statement]

[Text] An Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman commented on the allegations and rumors that the Afghan Armed Forces had used chemical and poisonous weapons around Jalalabad.

He stated:

With the shameful defeat of the extremists, a number of known persons, particularly the extremist leaders and Pakistani and U.S. authorities, have spread incorrect and groundless allegations saying that the Afghan Armed Forces have resorted to the use of chemical weapons around Jalalabad.

A number of U.S. Congress members have gone a step further by talking about a chemical war and its prevention in Afghanistan.

Such allegations and fabrications have consistently originated from these circles in the course of the 10-year undeclared war against our country. The experience of these past years has shown that while they spread lies about Afghanistan's so-called use of chemical weapons, they themselves put lethal advanced weapons at the disposal of the extremist elements in order to continue terrorist activities.

The Republic of Afghanistan, which is one of the signatories of the 1935 Geneva Protocol concerning the prohibition of the use of poisonous gases and other means of biological warfare and of the 1979 convention on the prohibition of the development and acquisition of biological, bacteriological, and poisonous weapons, has observed its pledges and obligations with regard to these credible international documents.

Relying on the belief that the production, development, and propagation of chemical weapons should be prevented and that such weapons should be completely eliminated, the Republic of Afghanistan has acquired no chemical weapons of any type whatsoever. It does not and will not in the future seek to acquire such weapons, the use of which it considers a crime against humanity.

The Afghan Armed Forces, including its Air Force and ground forces, have sufficient capability to rebuff and repel the armed opposition's subversion and aggression. Only those whose position is weak and who face defeat resort to the use of chemical weapons.

We consider even the use of conventional weapons, which unfortunately and contrary to our inclinations has been imposed on us by the armed extremists and their protectors, an unnecessary deed.

The Republic of Afghanistan, which is sincerely seeking to maintain lasting peace and whose peaceful policies are reaching our people's hearts and minds with each passing day, is making every effort to achieve reconciliation and understanding between the people of the country and will never resort to the use of such lethal weapons as chemical weapons.

We firmly believe that by spreading such rumors and allegations that the extremists on the one hand are trying to conceal their shameful defeat and compensate for their shattered morale.

On the other hand, they are trying to prepare the ground for their use of chemical weapons, and they plan subsequently to place the responsibility for it on the shoulders of the Afghan Armed Forces.

This matter has caused the Afghan Government deep concern. It believes that equipping terrorist extremists with advanced weapons will have in grave consequences. It is feared that those who supply the extremists with Stingers and Blow-pipes will likewise place advanced chemical weapons at their disposal.

The time has come for the U.S. senators and all others who are talking about humanity and aiding the Afghan people to make the U.S. Government support a political solution to the Afghan question rather than a military solution in supplying more weapons and ammunition that kill and murder thousands of innocent human beings.

The Afghan Foreign Ministry, with full responsibility, completely rejects all of these groundless allegations and fabrications and declares that it is prepared to invite UN experts to Afghanistan and to provide them with every possible facility to investigate these baseless allegations and to put an end to the fabrication of these rumors and slander.

ISRAEL

Mosad Said Acting Against Arab Missile Systems
TA2804174289 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
28 Apr 89 p 1

["Exclusive" report from London by Dalya Sharon]

[Text] London—The Israeli Government has instructed the Mosad to act against the development of missile systems in Egypt and Iraq. This is reported by knowledgeable sources in London.

The explosion in the car of the director general of the Consen [as published] Company in the south of France last summer is part of this operation. The Consen Company has offices in Switzerland, Austria, and Monaco, and it is active under the cover of an administration company.

Company officials refuse to respond to questions about their role in the development of the Condor-2 missile, being jointly developed by Egypt and Argentina with Iraqi financing. One of the companies which has business links with Consen, "The Institute for Advanced Technology," centered in Zug, Switzerland, was mentioned in U.S. court documents as the body through which \$1 million was transferred and used for the purchase of technological products whose export is banned by the United States.

Another company, centered in Salzburg, supplies "coordination services" as part of the Egyptian commitment to the project.

According to the London sources, the project engineers met in Salzburg last week to discuss the technical difficulties which the project has encountered lately. The type of fuel to be used for the second stage of the missile's development has not yet been determined, and

the date for the test launching in Argentina has been postponed time and again. The sources report that what is being planned is a missile with a range of 1,000 km.

The British sources are convinced that although the project is advancing slowly, and is lagging behind similar Israeli projects, the Condor will ultimately reach the experimental stage.

Since 1987 the United States has adopted a policy of restricting the sale and export of components which may be used in the production of missiles and guidance systems. This is delaying the Condor-2 project.

According to the London sources, Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah was deposed because his name was raised in the context of technological smuggling in California. A U.S. citizen, who had been a childhood friend of the Egyptian minister, was caught and imprisoned for attempting to circumvent U.S. exports limitation laws.

Despite the fact that Abu Ghazalah was "shelved," at least outwardly, Egypt is continuing to develop the project at Abu Za'bal, northeast of Cairo. It is estimated that the missile will not be ready for testing before 1992.

West European Military Integration Viewed
18160007i Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I*
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 2, Feb 89 pp 104-115

[Article by Anatoliy Viktorovich Rassadin, senior scientific associate at the World Economy and International Relations Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences: "West European Military Integration—Prospects and Possible Consequences"]

[Text] Study of the current, increasingly dynamic processes occurring in the military sphere requires a broad comprehensive approach and their correlation with the new trends encompassing on a broad front the economic, political and social spheres of world development. As observed in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the 19th party conference, an intensification of the internationalization of all processes is characteristic of the increasingly integral and interdependent world, granted all its contradictoriness.

The proposition concerning the unity and indivisibility of the world around us representing a complex system of relationships and interdependencies of states and regions pertains equally, it would seem, to military activity also. For this reason it is particularly important when evaluating the role of the military component in present-day international relations to proceed not from evolved stereotypes but to consider the general trend of the internationalization of all spheres of activity. Including those, as it seemed earlier, of an exclusively national nature of its components like the military sphere. In other words, it is a question of development of the process of internationalization of the role and functions of military power and the system of international security taking shape under the new conditions.

I

The abrupt political and military consolidation of the capitalist countries occurred within the framework of the bipolar world in the postwar period. This was manifested, as is known, in the formation of the NATO bloc. However, this process subsequently came to be suffused with new content as a result of the appearance of multiplying objective prerequisites which brought about a qualitatively new level of coordination of states' military and political efforts. It reflects the complex configuration of the modern world, including, specifically, the gradual "erosion" of the bipolar structure and a considerable expansion of the geography of the active participants in military activity.

This development of events, accompanied, nonetheless, by the continuation of centripetal trends in the military sphere, also had an appreciable economic basis formed by qualitative changes in the world capitalist economy. A big part was played at a particular stage by the policy of the United States in respect of its allies, which actively stimulated the internationalization of the capitalist

economy. Following the comparatively short period of postwar restoration thanks to a set of both extra- and intraregional factors, integration processes came to be developed in West Europe. The United States' cooperation with Japan and the West European countries assumed with the growth of their economic potential increasingly ramified and mature forms, their interdependence increased and economic interests became intertwined.

Undoubtedly, this by no means precludes the preservation and emergence even of new nontraditional forms of interimperialist contradictions. However, under conditions where not extensive (as was the case earlier) but intensive (associated with assimilation of the results of the S&T revolution) factors of development became determining such "traditional" indicators of economic and military power as territory with its raw material resources, population and so forth, the aspiration to acquire which had been the motive of virtually all wars, lost their former significance. As a result the incentives to wage wars "within" one system simply disappeared among the developed countries. In addition, the world capitalist economy, which is now characterized by an exceptionally complex, ramified system of relationships, essentially dictates a new evaluation of the role of military power. It is obvious that a situation has taken shape whereby its direct use on some in any way significant scale for the solution of possible international conflicts is meaningless and is becoming simply impossible without the danger of destruction of the foundations of mutual relations of vital importance to each country.¹ For this reason interstate and regional institutions for settling political and economic problems began to take shape and develop.

The internationalization of economic activity and the need connected therewith for coordination of positions in approaches to the accomplishment of world-economic tasks is being reflected in the political sphere also. No accident, therefore, is the trend, which is becoming increasingly distinct, toward a manifest enhancement of the political component in the annual meetings of the heads of state of the seven most developed capitalist countries. It has to be emphasized that the mere fact of the creation of such a coordinating institution of the leading powers (representing simultaneously the "three power centers" also) is of extraordinarily great significance.

Thus the impossibility, essentially, of a military conflict between the capitalist countries is associated not only, as it has frequently been customary to believe, with the confrontation of the two systems in the world arena. The reasons are far more diverse. And, it would seem, we should cite among the most essential of them the imperative of the internationalization of all spheres of human activity. The rapid progress of this all-embracing phenomenon is leading to a large extent to a unification and identity of views on problems of security and creating in the West, for example, a certain division of functions in

the military policy of countries and coalitions thereof. This is serving as the basis for an intensification of centripetal trends in the military sphere and becoming the starting point of the developing process of internationalization of military power (although within the framework of the existing military-political formations as yet).

Together with this the appearance of nuclear weapons and, subsequently, the strategic nuclear parity which took shape between the USSR and the United States also created limits in principle to the use of military force along East-West lines. It is in practice generally acknowledged that the military solution of the historical contradiction between socialism and capitalism is tantamount to collective suicide.

With the growth, on the other hand, of the economic and political significance of new power centers (or sub-centers) their military component also will inevitably have to be built into an all-embracing system of international security, without which it cannot be created. Therefore as the entire complex of intercountry and interregional relations continues to deepen and expand on a truly global scale, military force as a means of realization of political ends will evidently in time essentially wither away. This should lead to a change in the nature and scale of military preparations, which will to an increasingly large extent be a reflection of the **limited or even, in time, "police" functions of the internationalizing armed forces.**

In speaking of the internationalization of the role and functions of military power, we proceed from the fact that it is a most important component of the process of formation of an all-embracing international system of collective security. As a result military power must gradually become an instrument of joint action (within the UN framework, for example) for the world community's prevention of a dangerous exacerbation of possible crisis situations.

At the same time it has to be noted that if relations along East-West lines do not steadily improve, it is obvious that the internationalization process will be localized within the confines of the groupings confronting one another, making impossible in principle the creation and functioning of this common system of international security.

At the present time the processes of internationalization of economic, political and military aspects of states' activity are developing at two levels, as it were—global and regional.

The first level is the intensifying internationalization of all interstate relations creating the bases of a global world-economic and political structure. It is clear that up to now its formation has proceeded at a quite slow pace and has been determined to a considerable extent by the

relations of the two social systems. As their political and economic relationships expand and intensify, this process will obviously be manifested increasingly distinctly.

The second is the regional, "focal" level. It is here that integration is developing. In terms of depth and intensity it is considerably outpacing global internationalization processes, although is an inalienable part of them.

All this is reflected in full in the military sphere also. And in recent years, what is more, the intensity of the changes therein has been clearly growing and is now no longer inferior in terms of tempo to the changes in the economic and political spheres. However, internationalization in the military sphere is at the global level developing unevenly, attaining its most developed forms in relations between the leading capitalist countries. It is here that the highest level of political and military stability and unity of common strategic interests is observed.

With its allies' participation the United States has in the last decade also been exerting big efforts for the formation of so-called **aggregate military power**, a task of which is incorporation of as large a part of the South as possible in joint military activity. This is associated with the need to maintain stability in the so-called "peripheral" regions playing an ever increasing part in the economy and policy of the United States and its allies; the most striking example is the Asia-Pacific region and the Near and Middle East. It has to be noted that a most serious argument employed for realization of this policy is the proposition concerning the continuing "globalization of the Soviet military presence".

A characteristic feature of regional integration, however, is the fact that it aspires in its development to the creation of supranational forms of social relations and is leading to the formation of the corresponding regional institutions and is intended in a more mature form to combine within it to a greater or lesser extent uniform economic, political and military structures. The processes occurring in West Europe, where integration has acquired fully shaped contours, may serve as the clearest example of such development. Military integration is being accompanied by the formation of the corresponding common military-economic base and the gradual coordination of uniform military-political concepts. It is a reflection and expression not simply of a sum total of national interests but is developing in subordination to regional tasks. In this connection military development in West Europe is being implemented also under the influence of the ever increasing role of regional priorities, which is essentially leading to **the armed forces' loss of their exclusively national nature** (understanding by this a fundamental change in the situation which had taken shape over a long period of history, when even allied countries implemented their military preparations in isolation, without direct and constant cooperation at all stages—from the elaboration of the concepts of such preparations through support for the tasks of efficient operational interaction).

With a varying degree of intensity integration processes are blazing a trail for themselves in other regions of the world also. However, for objective reasons their development, in the military sphere included, is taking place under conditions which are appreciably different from West European conditions. This is connected primarily with the fact that the West European region itself represents quite a unique phenomenon. Specifically, the world's sole so "compact" association of highly developed capitalist countries is located here. In addition, it perceives the powerful impact of such a geopolitical factor as the proximity of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries, being the center of East-West military confrontation.

It is essential, in our view, when studying West European integration to clearly determine its causes and aims. As far as the first are concerned, we agree entirely with those who believe that not only economic but also political integration in the region was brought about by objective prerequisites.² However, military integration is often separated from the above integration into some independent component depending not on objective factors but on situational, albeit very serious, circumstances. In other words, it is allegedly possible, for example, to practice full economic integration, but separate from it the military-economic component, move gradually toward greater political unity, but ignore here still so an important an instrument as military policy, aspire to the implementation of a common S&T policy but in some way cut it off from R&D associated with the military sphere, which is, incidentally, becoming increasingly interwoven with the civil sphere. Our position, however, is that military integration is inseparable from the general integration process. This will be the case as long as the military component is actually present in the system of international relations.

Discussion of the aims of military integration in Europe merits special attention. They are interpreted here in a number of articles published in our press as being geared to a change in the balance of forces between East and West and, consequently, as being potentially dangerous for the USSR. In our view, this is incorrect. We will examine this problem in more detail below. It is expedient here merely to note that West European integration is, of course, to a considerable extent also a reaction of countries of the region to East-West military confrontation. However, they have not played, are not now playing (and, what is most important) do not wish to play in the foreseeable future the part of a force capable of independently solving problems of global confrontation.

In addition, an important goal of military integration in the region and one that is becoming increasingly significant is securing regional "vital interests" outside of Europe under the conditions of the possible growth of instability along North-South lines in an atmosphere of a perfectly probable sharp lowering of the intensity of the confrontation along West-East lines. An example of this, incidentally, may be considered the concerted actions

within the Western European Union framework of West European countries in the Persian Gulf. I would like to emphasize that they were undertaken in close interaction with other Western states.

Such are some general considerations pertaining to integration problems.

Two constituents should conditionally be distinguished in the process of West European military integration, in our view: military-economic and military-political integration (although they are closely interrelated and subordinated to a common goal, of course).

By military-economic integration in NATO's West European region we mean the formation of a system of intercountry mutual relations which creates the necessary prerequisites for the permanently coordinated use of resources allocated for military needs in individual states of the region; the joint implementation of programs of the development and production of arms and military equipment accompanied by the gradual loss by sectors of the military industry of their exclusively national nature; the construction of a common infrastructure; and so forth.

This process incorporates as components a complex system of bi- and multilateral intercountry relations in various spheres of military-economic activity and, like the process of European economic integration, is aimed not at the full equalization of individual-country singularities (although a certain "leveling" is taking place, of course) but at the formation of the corresponding conditions for the pursuit of a concerted long-term military-economic and military-technical policy, including the creation of a regional arms market.

To speak of military-political integration, it is expressed in an aspiration to the formulation of a common military policy and common regional military-strategic concepts and common principles of the development of the armed forces of the various countries and their permanent orientation toward interaction of the maximum efficiency based both on the growth of interdependence and a sharing of functions.

The final goal of this constituent of military integration is the realization of common approaches to the so-called "defense of the European area" and, correspondingly, an evolution of the military policy of individual countries which, given the preservation of a number of specific features, provides for their natural transition to principles of the accomplishment of tasks at the regional level.

In both the West European part of NATO and in the United States the viewpoint which back at the start of the 1970's was reflected in the "mature partnership" concept is strengthening increasingly. The meaning thereof amounts, *inter alia*, to the need for the West European countries' contribution to the bloc's military preparations to be brought into line with their powerful

integrated economic base. Employing the NATO mechanism and also considering the growing process of the further development of European integration in the economic and political spheres, the United States has contributed to a large extent to the formation and independent military development of the "European pillar of NATO". In this connection the 1970's were a turning point not only as a result of the growth of the proportional military spending of West European countries. This occurred primarily as a consequence of their attainment of a new level in military-economic activity, which was directly reflected in the nature of intrabloc relations also. What it had earlier been customary to call a "one-way street" (in the sense of the predominant equipment of the allied armies with American models of arms and military equipment), when many West European states were in practice merely importers of this military product or technology, is gradually being transformed into "equal" partnership relations.

It should, however, be noted that, despite the West European countries' often declared aspiration to the organization of "bilateral movement" in military cooperation with the United States and an actual growth in the share of European products in military trade between the bloc's two regions, the complete equalization of exchange is in this case evidently unattainable. It is hardly expedient even for the NATO countries. And not only in connection, what is more, with the military-technical lagging of the United States' West European partners. The main reason is the ongoing development of regional specialization and the particular features of the military economy of the two "pillars" of NATO. In this sense equal-partner relations appear, from our viewpoint, as the equalization of levels of responsibility for safeguarding particular "strategic" interests, the nature of which has been modified considerably since the time the bloc was founded. In other words, at the present time the West European countries are capable of tackling problems of regional defense with a great degree of independence, paying priority attention to the development of "conventional" arms most fully corresponding to these requirements.

This approach to military development naturally differs markedly from the American approach geared to supporting a global strategy. In the material sphere this is manifested, specifically, in the fact that, owing to the "specificity" of many both American and West European military equipment models, the reciprocal use of the products of the military industry of both parts of the bloc is in principle of a limited nature.⁴ This is explained not only by the difference in level of S&T development, which was determining earlier. The reason is the insufficiently determined dependence between the scale and intensity of military preparations and the actual military-political goals which this state or group of states or the other sets itself.

II

The biggest successes in military integration have been achieved in military-economic activity. Thus in the West

European region of NATO even now in fact all large-scale advanced projects for the development and manufacture of arms (whether it be a question of national efforts, production of American models on license or joint efforts with the United States) are implemented on a multilateral basis. The trend toward a comprehensive, regional approach at the time of the selection and realization of new military programs, even if at first sight concord in the partners' actions is lacking, has been manifested increasingly distinctly recently. An example of this is the development of the EFA and Rafale aircraft. Each of them is being built to perform various functions by different groups of countries. However, technology is being exchanged and efforts to standardize a number of components are being made in the R&D phase.⁵ Following the interlinked decisions of Great Britain and France on the purchase of the American AWACS early warning and observation system, which prior to this had been used by other countries of the region, both the Rafale and EFA are being built in the expectation of interaction with this system.

Finally, efforts are being stepped up in West Europe pertaining to the formation of a regional S&T base, which, although going beyond the framework of military problems, is most directly connected with them.

The current level of development of R&D, of a military purpose included, is causing growing concern in West Europe. Compared with the United States, the European NATO countries are spending almost four times less on military R&D. However, it is not only a question of the amount being spent. Thus the Europeans spend on R&D as a whole twice as much as Japan, but, as is known, are considerably inferior to their competitors in the fruitfulness of scientific research.⁶ The duplication in research efforts and thereby the scattering of resources are leading, specifically, to a lowering of the efficiency of their use and making a solution of the problem of standardization more difficult.

Mention should also be made in this connection of the fact that the Eureka program is enjoying ever increasing development. Thus 10 projects were approved in 1985, 62 in 1986 (at a total cost of approximately \$2 billion) and twice as many in 1987. Being realized also is a whole number of important regional S&T programs along EC lines, without, however, so clearly an expressed political character as the Eureka. It is essentially designed to ensure the technological component of the West European countries' independence under the conditions of the new stage of S&T progress.

It should be noted that all these projects mark in toto a fundamentally new approach to S&T cooperation, a distinguishing feature of which is the shaping of long-term uniform regional S&T policy. Thus without going into an evaluation of the specific forms into which this

process may develop, we may with sufficient certainty speak about attempts at the present time to form a common West European S&T base.

In evaluating the state of military-economic integration as a whole it needs to be mentioned that a large part of the West European military programs is already of a joint nature. In a number of countries, the FRG, for example, spending on the realization of multinational projects constitutes more than 70 percent of total outlays on the development and purchase of arms and military equipment.⁷ All this is making it possible to speak of the formation of the foundations of a common regional military-economic structure.

However, the further extension of military integration in West Europe has until recently been held back by the absence of marked progress in the military-political sphere. It is here that events are now occurring which could be of decisive significance for the prospects not only of West European military cooperation but also, in the broad sense, for military interaction in the bloc as a whole. The scale of military-economic integration which has been achieved, the recognized need for such relations, the implementation of practical measures connected with them pertaining to the introduction of a common purchasing policy, the change in the structure of national armed forces and, finally, the coordination of strategic concepts and the goals of military cooperation are putting on the agenda increasingly often the question of the appropriate military-political institutions.

A whole number of steps is being taken in this direction. First, an ever increasing number of military-political problems is the subject of examination in the regional institutions which already exist (the Western European Union, the Independent European Programming Group and, to some extent, in the EC). Second, a distinct trend toward endowing them with new assignments pertaining to the coordination of military-political activity with the possible imparting to them of, at least, some of the functions of a "regional military alliance" is being manifested. Most promising in this respect, evidently, is the Western European Union, although its stimulation is proving complex. In addition, the union has only seven countries; it should, however, be noted that a trend toward its enlargement is already, evidently, perfectly defined.⁸ Third, spurring organizational solutions in this channel at the regional level, processes of close inter-country military-political interaction are developing. The most significant of them is, of course, Franco-West German military cooperation. It has attained the greatest development and now encompasses practically all spheres of military activity, including the creation of a "defense council" and the formation of a common brigade consisting of servicemen from both countries. This interaction is seen in a number of instances as a kind of model for the development of the regional process, the more so in that both these countries are also "centers" of military-economic integration in West Europe.

Simultaneously the two countries' cooperation is raising a whole number of complex issues brought about by the fact that formally it is being exercised outside of the organizational structures of NATO since France is not a member of the bloc's military organization. This is all the more important in that such relations have recently been developing quite actively. Mention should also be made, however, of Spain's intention to take advantage of the subunit being formed in accordance with the "rapid deployment" force model for interaction under special circumstances with the French Quick Reaction Alert. Talks are under way in this area between Spain, France and Italy concerning the signing of a set of agreements on the interaction of their armed forces in the Mediterranean area. To support it France intends, *inter alia*, transferring some of the AWACS aircraft to be purchased in the United States for permanent patrolling in this zone.⁹ It is also significant that France and Great Britain envisage extensive cooperation within the framework of the use of their fleet of AWACS aircraft which is being created, which is by the mid-1990's to number 15.⁹

Anglo-French consultations have been stepped up recently in connection with the possible coordination of the operations of their independent strategic nuclear forces.

New forms of cooperation are also being developed simultaneously with this within the framework of the bloc's military organization itself. Thus, for example, the Benelux countries intend creating a joint subunit which is to be attached to the NATO command in Central Europe.

Thus the extension of military integration in West Europe is occurring in two planes, as it were: within the framework of the NATO military organization and outside of it. It is intensifying in both the military-economic and military-political spheres and in the sphere of organizational development of the armed forces. Considering the composition of the countries (both members of the bloc's military organization and those which are not members of it) and also the unfolding common target function to which these processes are subordinate, it is perfectly obvious that an interweaving of at first sight seemingly parallel lines of regional military development is under way also. It would seem in this connection that at the present time we are witnessing phenomena in which quite flexible and diverse manifold use is being made of the most diverse forms of cooperation. It is essentially merely a question of choice of the most suitable of them, with the aid of which account may be taken of the specific interests of this country or the other within the framework of the general trend.

We would emphasize that although West European military integration is a reflection of the objective processes developing within the region itself and that no alternative to it—as to integration as a whole—is in sight, the

rate and possible consequences of its intensification and expansion will largely depend on relations in the United States-West Europe-USSR "triangle".

Specifically, a factor influencing military integration is the fact that the United States is to a considerable extent reconsidering the role of the West European region in its global policy. The abrupt stimulation of U.S. activity pertaining to the formation of aggregate military power is also a reflection of essential changes in military-strategic priorities.¹⁰ Connected with this is the growing—together with recognition of the strategic importance of West Europe in realization of the general concept of global opposition to the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries—U.S. attention to regions outside of NATO. As a result the West European NATO region has come to be assigned a new, more independent role. As already mentioned, this applies not only (and in the future, possibly, not so much) to opposition to the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe but also to the exercise of possible power actions in areas of European "vital interests" directly adjoining the continent (North Africa, the Near East the Persian Gulf region) and also to the securing of strong positions of countries of the region in other parts of the world. In turn, the United States is assuming global military-strategic functions, pertaining to the formation of elements of aggregate military power in other parts of the world included. U.S. pressure on West European countries to increase their contribution to NATO's military preparations is being exerted mainly in the direction of a buildup of the fighting capacity of their "conventional" armed forces which is essentially to cater for the availability of the potential for independent opposition to the corresponding forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. H. Kissinger wrote in an article in *TIME* magazine entitled "Plan for the Restructuring of NATO": "By 1990 Europe must have assumed the basic responsibility for ground-based nonnuclear defense. This is perfectly within the capabilities of a group of countries with a population almost 1.5 times greater than that of the USSR and with a GNP which is almost twice as large."

Recently the pronouncements of a number of American official spokesmen have pursued increasingly often the idea that the significance of Europe as the basic and principal sphere of its strategic interests has for the United States been diminishing as a consequence, specifically, of its reduced role as an economic partner also. In particular, the United States' commodity turnover with countries of the Pacific region is one-third greater than the commodity exchange with West Europe.¹¹ According to a statement by L. Eagleburger, former U.S. assistant secretary of state, "the United States' economic interests are turning increasingly away from Europe toward the more dynamically developing economies of the Pacific. Relations dictated by objective economic interests, which earlier contributed to the unity of NATO, may not be so strong in the future."¹²

Thus under the new conditions West Europe, as the United States' ally, is in U.S. military-strategic concepts

assigned an important, but not "exclusive," as earlier, place. From the main and, once, essential sole partner of the United States in the global opposition to the socialist countries the states of the West European region of the NATO bloc are becoming merely an element of the aggregate military power of imperialism which is taking shape and whose assignments and functions are far broader than traditional bloc functions and are a reaction to the "erosion" of the bipolar world.

For this reason the present scale of the American military presence in West Europe and the "diversion" of resources connected with this are being seen increasingly in the United States as not corresponding to the current notion of its political and economic interests. It is emphasized here that the current political and military stability in Europe at the present time suits all parties and could not be altered without the danger of a large-scale military conflict being provoked. It is this which to a considerable extent explains the fact that the United States has begun to display an interest in the continued intensification of military integration in West Europe as a necessary condition for shifting onto its allies greater "responsibility" for regional defense. The United States would hereby release resources for operations in other parts of the world in accordance with its present notions concerning zones of interests (at the present time more than 50 percent of American military spending is directly connected with European defense¹³).

It has to be noted that the conclusion of the Soviet-American INF agreement led to a sharp intensification of "Eurocentrist trends," a rapid growth in sentiments in favor of greater self-reliance and formulation of the principles of a common defense concept. However, the aspiration of West European countries toward greater military independence by no means signifies that they intend in the foreseeable future to take the path of liquidation of their strategic alliance with the United States. It is a question, in our view, merely of West European countries' search for their own place in this alliance corresponding to their regional interests and possibilities whereby, it would seem, conditions could emerge for a gradual lessening of the proportion of the military component in the overall system of transatlantic relations.

A certain transformation of NATO itself is inevitable in this connection. The process of military integration in West Europe accompanied by, as it is customary to call it in the West, the "Europeanization" of the bloc and the gradual reduction of its functions to the accomplishment of tasks chiefly of "regional strategy" is leading to the more equal partner relations of the United States and the West European "power center". Of course, in speaking of "regional strategy" we mean a quite broad interpretation of tasks determined by zones of actual regional interests. It should for this reason be emphasized that the regional military policy which is taking shape is associated not only with relations along East-West lines (although it is they which are determining at the present

time) but also to a considerable extent with other aspects of West European interests, whose significance could in the future increase appreciably.

In evaluating the likely consequences of West European military integration and its significance for international security the following needs to be borne in mind: by virtue of the economic, political and social realities of West Europe and also with regard for the extraordinarily high degree of economic assimilation of the territory, density of the population and so forth and the disastrous consequences associated with this of any military conflict (even without the use of nuclear weapons) and the continuing specific national interests, it is obvious that consensus in the military sphere may be achieved by the countries of the region only on a defensive basis. Of course, this proposition is valid only on the important condition that primarily the interests of the West European countries themselves are taken into consideration at the time of formulation of this "regional strategy".

The present political course of the USSR aimed at a lowering of the level of military confrontation and realization in practice of the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine affords propitious conditions for a slowing of the process of militarization of the West European countries and the alignment of their defense efforts with the criteria of "reasonable sufficiency". The new proposals of the Warsaw Pact states concerning negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe could, specifically, be of great significance.

Under current conditions the nature of interregional military-economic relations in NATO is being modified and will be modified to a large extent under the impact of its integrated West European grouping and correspond to an ever increasing extent to the interests of the latter (which is by no means contrary to the interests of the United States). Such relations are even now enjoying the greatest development in the sphere of creation of new weapons systems in respect of regional conditions and concepts of their use. However, further progress at the negotiations, on conventional arms particularly, could make appreciable adjustments to this activity.

At the same time, considering the latest integration trends, particularly in the military-political sphere, the relative significance of West European relations themselves should, to judge by everything, grow considerably, and the nature thereof intensify in the direction of the building of a ramified military structure with precise forms and most "strictly" subordinate to regional interests.

Owing to the objective nature of West European military integration, the basic trends, which are already being manifested quite distinctly in regional military development, will evidently continue for the foreseeable future also. However, this by no means signifies an "automatic" increase in West European countries' military

potential. The impact of integration on this process will depend on various internal and, chiefly, external factors, which were examined above. Of course, we also have to see the attempts to use the growing joint possibilities of the West European NATO countries for the creation of new types of conventional arms, which, it is maintained, is caused by the need to counter the "huge preponderance" of the Warsaw Pact forces over NATO in Europe. However, in the event of the successful development of the negotiations, such reasoning would be simply pointless.

In addition, even now many authoritative specialists in the West are arguing and talking openly about the fact that the dimensions of the "threat" to NATO are greatly exaggerated. A report by Sen C. Levin, chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Conventional Armed Forces and Alliance Defense, devoted to an assessment of the correlation of forces in Europe, in particular, testifies to this.¹⁴

The development of West European military integration will be stimulated not only by problems in East-West relations, the uncertainty of the prospects of the American military presence in Europe and also possible complications in relations along North-South lines. With regard for the West European countries' great dependence on sources of raw material and West Europe's direct contiguity with areas of potential tension the bottom line for a reduction in military efforts in the region may be determined by these circumstances to a large extent. Military integration under these conditions will be an increasingly important instrument providing for a substantial (relative, at least) reduction in the contents of the military programs of each individual state based on optimization of the use of aggregate resources.

In fact a driving idea of military integration is the creation of conditions for the more or less independent accomplishment of regional tasks. And this, in turn, is an essential prerequisite for the possibility of movement away from problems of global confrontation which are not inherent in the region. Integration is hereby an instrument serving the transition of West European countries to a different scale of military preparations. This, given the propitious development of international relations, will afford an opportunity for not only relative but also absolute reductions therein.

The current situation is opening the way also to realization of perfectly definite possibilities of a lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe and the building of a "European home" based on the principles of the new political thinking. Objective conditions are being created for a diminution in the overall scale of military preparations of the West European NATO members, given the continued intensification of their military interaction. Such a development of events would lead to a growth of the significance of the political constituent in relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the

USSR and West European countries, given a diminishing role of the military power factor. Under these conditions both the interregional military-economic relations of NATO and the processes of military integration of the West European countries could be modified significantly and acquire new features reflecting the positive changes in East-West relations.

The integration processes in the military sphere in West Europe are on the one hand a reflection of the objective conditions taking shape in this region with regard for the sum total of political, economic and military factors. On the other, they are connected also, in our view, with the broader process of internationalization of states' military activity, which, albeit belatedly, is becoming just as much a reality as in all other spheres of activity. There arises the natural question: is this a good thing or a danger? Unfortunately, it is hardly possible now to give an unequivocal answer. If there is no further positive development in East-West relations, this phenomenon, as mentioned above, could essentially be the catalyst of an arms race, given the qualitative increase in and enhanced efficiency of military preparations. Military-political instability at the global and regional levels would increase here, which, of course, would preclude for many countries, the USSR included, the possibility of emergence from an enervating arms race. If the change in the atmosphere in the world continues to be rather of a positive nature, such internationalization will be a positive phenomenon. It will contribute to the formulation of common approaches to security problems, the emergence of new opportunities for limiting the use of military power, the creation of a mechanism of international safeguards and the increased interdependence of various countries and their associations in the military sphere.

Footnotes

1. See D. Proyektor, "World Wars and the Fate of Mankind," Moscow, 1986, pp 223-227.
2. See, for example, "West European Integration: Political Aspects," Moscow, 1985, p 16.
3. Not only military but also long-term economic and political interests are implied by "strategic" here.
4. It is indicative in this connection that together with an appreciable reduction in the list of fully assembled arms there is a growing proportion in interregional relations of joint-labor deals at unit and component level and also joint programs beginning in the R&D phase.
5. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 29 April 1986, p 8.
6. DEFENCE, May 1987, p 234.
7. JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 11 April 1987, p 660.

* With the entry of Spain and Portugal into the Western European Union at the end of 1988 the alliance now numbers nine countries.

8. JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 19 December 1987, p 1405.
9. INTERAVIA AIR LETTER, 23 January 1987, p 3; 13 April 1987, p 5.
10. See "Military-Economic Relations of the NATO Countries: Aims, Scale and Forms of Realization," Moscow, 1988, pp 211-236.
11. "Statistical Abstract of the US, 1987," Washington, D.C., 1986, pp 792-793.
12. NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS, June-July 1985, p 21.
13. Ibid., p 16.
14. "Beyond the Bean Count. Realistically Assessing the Conventional Military Balance in Europe". Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense. January 20, 1988 (See MEMO No 5, 1988, pp 103-104).

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Possible Aspects of CFE Agreement Discussed

Editorial Introduction

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No 12, 26 Mar-2 Apr 89 pp 8-9

[Text] Talks on conventional forces in Europe and talks on confidence-building measures and security are in progress in Vienna's Hofburg imperial palace. The main objective of the talks is to reach a balanced agreement on substantial cuts in the armed forces and conventional arms of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

How are these talks proceeding? What are the arguments on either side? What are the chances for success? We asked experts from the East and West.

Numerical Ceilings Urged

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[Article by Vitaly Zhurkin, Director, Institute of Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Can talks on conventional arms involving 23 countries and talks on confidence and security measures involving 33 countries take a new course of development and become more dynamic and productive? In my opinion, this is already happening.

CUTS IN THE ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY BUDGETS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES

Country	Troop reduction	Tanks	APCs	Guns and mortars	War planes	Military budget cut	Notes
Bulgaria	10,000	200	—	200	20	12%	5 naval ships cut
Czechoslovakia	12,000	850	165	—	51	15%	Division and regiment tactical exercises cut by 50%. Live ammo practice firing cut by 25%-30%
GDR	10,000	600	—	—	50	10%	
Poland	9,300	251	30	430 *	9	17%	*including 180 antitank weapons (ATWs)
Romania	15,000	—	—	—	—	From 7.7% to 5.5% of state budget	
WTO total (without USSR)	56,300	1,901	195	630 *	130		*including 180 ATWs
USSR in Europe	240,000	10,000	—	8,500	800	14.2%	A 19.5% cut in equipment and weaponry production
WTO total in Europe	296,300	11,901	195	9,130 *	930		*including 180 ATWs
USSR in Asia	200,000	—	—	—	—		
USSR in the South	60,000	—	—	—	—		
WTO total	556,300	11,901	195	9,130 *	930		*including 180 ATWs

The international political situation created through the efforts of many countries is favourable: it is better than it was 2 years ago, and much better than 5 years ago. The outcome of the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has proved that both East and West are prepared to accept really formidable compromises. Incidentally, without these compromises the sides wouldn't have had a mandate for conventional arms talks.

The experience of preparing, signing and implementing the INF Treaty will have a constant positive influence on all talks. The bold readiness to scrap two classes of the most advanced armaments, a principally novel approach to the issue of verification and many other ideas have become part and parcel of the work for military-political disarmament. This primarily concerns the countries which came to the negotiation table in Vienna on 6 March.

Some of those countries arrived in the Austrian capital after making major contributions to the cause of ensuring the talks' success. Unilateral cuts in armed forces and armaments announced by the USSR and other WTO countries are important in themselves and—unquestionably stimulate the creation of an atmosphere favourable for talks.

Still, certain negative trials shouldn't be forgotten either. I mean the sad experience of another event in Vienna, namely the 15-year-long talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The rigidity of position, the excessive preoccupation with trifling issues and the lack of resoluteness in making political decisions, manifested during the talks, led them to an impasse. The negative experience of the former Vienna talks is a serious warning for any present and future negotiators.

The compatibility of the sides' positions should help impart a dynamic start to the new Vienna talks. The WTO countries have, several times during the recent period, proposed an eradication of the asymmetry in particular types of armaments, expressed a desire to work towards lowering the "ceilings" on existing armaments to match the level of the side possessing fewer such armaments, and have formulated a batch of concrete initiatives.

NATO also spoke in favour of eliminating the asymmetries and achieving a lower-level balance of armed forces. Its proposals also mention certain "ceilings" (for instance, on tank forces) which could well become a subject for negotiations.

'Similar Directives' Seen

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[Article by Sergei Kulik, research associate, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)]

[Text] Judging from the declarations of Warsaw Treaty and NATO leaders, the military doctrines of both blocs, especially in the political part, contain some similar directives.

Each side regards its doctrine as exclusively defensive, intended to prevent nuclear or conventional war. Each side also admits that in a nuclear war there can be no winners and that one mustn't strive for superiority. It is contended that neither side will strike first in Europe.

But both military-political alliances distrust the other's sincerity. The Warsaw Treaty countries are, as before, apprehensive about the NATO military doctrine and strategy. Specifically, the concept of "deep strikes into the second echelons" means conducting hostilities outside the territories of NATO member-countries. Also of serious concern are the operational plans of the tactical air force to gain "a superiority" mainly through massed attacks on enemy air bases and AA-defence facilities in the first hours of the war. The Warsaw Treaty countries suspect the U.S. Navy's intention is not so much to control sea communications by escorting convoys as to advance aircraft-carrier formations towards the coast of the USSR to strike at Soviet territory. NATO's superiority in naval forces and strike aircraft is specially stressed. Besides, NATO has openly confirmed its readiness to be the first to use tactical nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the West continues to accuse the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) of offensive intent in its development of land forces in the European theatre. NATO points to WTO's superiority in tanks, which could be used "for quick, deep penetration of enemy positions," and in motorized infantry formations to "complete the rout of surviving enemy groupings."

Now an agreement has been outlined for purposes of removing these disparities in political directives for the prevention of war and in the military-technical directives. The agreement expresses the need for specific measures. But the acknowledgement of such a need won't instantly dissolve the apprehensions on both sides.

Can the West count on further unilateral WTO initiatives without making any concessions of its own at the forthcoming negotiations? Or is it more expedient to strengthen stability on the continent with reciprocal compromises in consideration of the opponent's security interests?

NATO experts acknowledge that tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe are destabilizing. Nevertheless, many people regarded their preservation essential given

WTO superiority in some conventional armaments. But considering the initiatives on the part of the USSR and other socialist countries, this argument loses its persuasiveness. Western experts are now bent on proving that the modernization of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons has been completed. This is partly because of the Western concept of "competitive strategy," which calls for economically exhausting the USSR in the arms race and transferring this race to a course "profitable" for the West.

But the unilateral Soviet initiatives announced by M. S. Gorbachev at the UN and the subsequent steps by other WTO countries have weakened the West's criticisms of WTO, since these initiatives envisage cutting components most worrisome to NATO. NATO leaders now have good reason to reflect on the new opportunities to strengthen military stability in Europe.

The seriousness of the USSR's and WTO's intentions is under discussion by Western analysts. These initiatives boil down to aligning the socio-political (a combination of the principles of peaceful coexistence with the defensive nature of the doctrine) and the military-technical (material structure of the armed forces) parts of the military doctrine. These sentiments will no doubt influence debates within NATO on the future of its military doctrine and the decisions of its leadership.

Now there is a good opportunity to strengthen stability in Europe, first by revising the destabilizing elements of the NATO and WTO military doctrines. To consolidate these positive processes, apart from concrete breakthroughs at the forthcoming talks, it would be expedient to hold serious NATO-WTO discussions on their military doctrines.

Numerical 'Parity' Deprecated

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[Article by Alexey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Much has been written here about what's wrong in the West's position on disarmament. I feel that a more thorough discussion on where we stand would benefit the cause.

My impression is that, psychologically, we're still too hung up on parity, on numbers. We waste too much time trying to calculate how many and what stages there will be on the road to the final goal, but have we sufficiently studied the first stage, the concrete steps to implement it, the very complicated questions of control?

This first phase—the reciprocal elimination of asymmetries and imbalances—is often regarded as merely a preparatory step, a prologue. But let's take a closer look at the statistics published by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Let's take tanks. WTO has 60,000 tanks in Europe, while NATO has 30,000. If agreement is reached for a cut below the lowest of the levels, say to 25,000 tanks, WTO would have to eliminate 35,000 tanks (including the 12,000 that the East pledged to eliminate unilaterally). This would mean having to disband more than 100 armoured divisions, or nearly 150 motorized infantry divisions—in other words, cutting the armed forces by one-two million men. True, part of the tanks are in undermanned units or in mothballs.

At any rate it is clear that the ending of the asymmetry in itself constitutes unprecedented cuts in the armed forces. It would require a simultaneous restructuring of the armed forces on defensive principles, the creation of a comprehensive system of control, all of which would take a rather long time. More so because all that has been said about tanks also applies to other types of weapons and armed forces.

Parity is the only politically acceptable option for the sides. But parity isn't the final objective, it is only one of the principles of solving the task set in the Vienna mandate: the elimination of the potential for a surprise attack and for launching a large-scale offensive.

The point is that in the case of conventional armed forces, the correlation of defensive and offensive capabilities is assessed not through mere numerical strength, but to a much greater degree through troop location, structure and composition, cooperation of the different armed services, the possibilities of transporting reinforcements. And the element of surprise, of course. In 1967, Israel defeated the Arabs, although the latter had twice as many tanks and were numerically superior in all other respects. History is full of such examples.

In terms of security considerations, it is not important for WTO if at the end of the first stage NATO is left with 20,000 or 25,000 tanks, 3,000 or 4,000 aircraft. We should be rather more concerned with where and in what way these forces will be stationed, which part of them would remain at our doorstep in the centre of Europe and which part would be farther away—in Britain and Spain. How large would be their share in the combat-ready formations, the reserves and in mothballs. As a result, what would be the size of the Bundeswehr, the U.S. 7th Army and of the other countries within the NATO forces?

This means that all Europe should be divided into subzones. Notably, the cuts, restrictions and control procedures should be increasingly radical the closer the troops are stationed to each other. Not mere numerical cuts, but the breaking up of colossal military groupings, the dispersal of their strike and offensive elements, the monitored mutual lowering of troops' combat readiness—these are the things that deserve priority attention from the point of view of the Vienna mandate, and the first stage.

Notification, Limits on Exercises

52000046 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 12, 26 Mar-2 Apr 89 pp 8-9

[Article by Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubov]

[Text] Logically, the aim of all states in participating in conventional-forces talks is to "improve Europe's stability and security by establishing a stable and safe balance of conventional arms and equipment." This objective is mentioned in the talks' Mandate. This document also states that the security of the negotiating countries should not be impaired at any stage during the talks.

How can the objective of these talks be reached?

The reality is that talks aimed exclusively at balancing the number of weapons in which WTO has an edge on NATO while ignoring NATO's edge on WTO in other types of weapons will not result in greater stability or greater security.

The USSR and its allies could not feel secure given NATO's military superiority. NATO representatives would obviously feel similarly if WTO's goal was to eliminate all imbalances currently in NATO's favour.

To make the talks productive right from the start, one should abandon any hope of gaining unilateral advantages and focus on preserving rough military parity at all stages of the talks. Defensive arms and forces should be gradually pared to the lowest possible levels.

As for the talks on confidence-building measures and security in Europe, some of the issues raised are especially revealing of the different approaches.

Is there any validity in the West's idea that prior notification be required in case of land exercises while no prior notification should be required in case of naval manoeuvres near the other side's shore? It's hard to believe that the West is seriously threatened by one Soviet land division on manoeuvres in East Germany and not somewhere in the foothills of the Urals. And it's hard to deny the destabilizing effect of a NATO naval squadron cruising off the shore of a WTO country when its ships are studded with hundreds of strike aircraft and many cruise missiles capable of hitting targets in the interior of the USSR and allied countries. Hence navies too should come under the jurisdiction of confidence-building measures.

It would be equally illogical to send notifications about manoeuvres while never limiting their scope. Large-scale exercises increasingly resemble the preliminary operations conducted on the eve of a military attack. The other side cannot but react. Such exercises promote neither trust nor security in Europe.

Efforts by both sides are required to reach the goals set out in the talks' Mandate. As for the approach of the WTO countries to confidence-building measures, I consider that the limiting of military exercises and other troop activities would contribute substantially to reaching these goals.

West German Writes

52000046 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 12, 26 Mar-2 Apr 89 pp 8-9

[Article by Professor Horst Ehmke, Bundestag member, deputy, vice-chairman of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag, FRG]-See Map on P 34

[Text] The importance of the current talks in Vienna far transcends the borders of Europe: these talks will determine whether the momentum of disarmament started by the INF Treaty in December 1987 can be maintained or even increased.

The Vienna talks are concerned with reducing weapons and the military burden which is especially heavy for those states on the border between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty alliances. This is the cold war legacy, the result of the confrontation mentality it generated. Both East and West increasingly understand that security can't be attained by arming ourselves against one another. All the talk about disarmament in Europe will be fruitless if we fail to check the senseless buildup of conventional weapons.

Announcing a unilateral troop and weapons cuts at the UN on 7 December 1988, General Secretary Gorbachev put forward a commendable initiative which should now be responded to constructively at the negotiating table in Vienna. The talks should be conducted with clear goals in sight and proceeding from what is feasible in any given moment.

German Social Democrats think the guidelines for the Vienna talks should be as follows:

—Each side must relinquish its superiorities. The Soviet side, for example, has expressed its readiness as regards the tanks issue. The West mustn't discount its superiority, for example, in aircraft or in certain military technologies.

—No conventional arms system may be excluded from the talks.

—Efforts should be made to agree on a verifiable ban on new, technologically sophisticated weapons so as to prevent their possible destabilizing impact on security policy.

—The talks should consider the military potentials on the Baltic and Black seas.

—Whereas there exists an obvious connection between stability in conventional arms and the availability of short-range nuclear missiles and battle-field nuclear weapons, parallel disarmament talks should be started as soon as possible, this year, on European nuclear weapons systems. No new nuclear weapons systems liable to change the strategic balance should be introduced while the talks are in progress.

All Vienna participants should demonstrate their political will to achieve specific results. Reciprocal cuts in weapons and troops to 50 per cent of today's NATO level should serve as a reference-point in the initial stage of the conventional arms talks. In the final analysis, the talks should aim to create a systematic inability to be the aggressor—this term was coined by the German Social Democrats. This means that both sides should change their strategies and military structures in such a way as to forfeit their offensive capabilities and to become exclusively defensive.

Vienna is offering the first ever chance for a breakthrough to a new kind of peace in Europe, that of a peaceful competition and universal cooperation. The future of East-West relations, a peaceful Europe without the military burden—these are things at stake in Vienna. Vienna could mark the beginning of a new era.



This 1:500,000-scale map, appended to the operations plan of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, was signed 5 November 1946 and marked "Top Secret of Special Importance." As one can see, both documents (first published this February) emphasized defence with only a fraction of the forces covering the front. The only counter-blows planned were intended to maintain the defence position.

Ambassador to Turkey Interviewed on European Force Balance
NC0305112089 Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish
30 Apr 89 p 13

["Exclusive" interview with USSR Ambassador to Turkey Albert Chernyshev by CUMHURIYET correspondent Semih Idiz in Ankara; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Idiz] Mr Chernyshev, we have observed that significant developments have taken place not only in the Soviet Union's relations with Turkey but also in the USSR's international relations in general. What are the basic factors in this and what are the elements which were absent in the past but which are present now?

[Chernyshev] The factor which was absent in the past but which is present now is perestroika, which emerged in April 1985. International relations were maintained within a certain framework during the period between World War II and the year 1985. Behind this framework were nuclear arms, which were maintained for the purpose of intimidation; mutual intimidation, that is. These arms served as a deterrent to a certain degree. No major war was fought. We agree on this.

Nevertheless, there are "stable balances" and "unstable balances" in physics. This was an unstable peace. The decision reached by Gorbachev and his colleagues when they came to power was that this state of affairs could not be maintained. The existing situation could lead humanity to an unavoidable disaster. The Soviet Union realized that the situation went beyond every logical framework. What was to be done since this situation could not be maintained? After this a program was drawn up calling for a world free of nuclear arms by the year 2000. The program has entered the annals of history as belonging to Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

We are proposing a reduction in tactical nuclear arms for now and the complete removal of these weapons later on.

[Idiz] A number of NATO countries, however, headed by the United States, have argued that the Warsaw Pact has superiority in tactical nuclear arms. They claim that modernizing tactical nuclear arms is of great importance.

[Chernyshev] Correct. The Warsaw Pact countries have some superiority in tactical nuclear missiles, but this cannot be a reason for the modernization of the existing missiles. Nor can it be a reason for the emergence of new ones, like the Lance-2 missiles, which have a range of 480 km. We support the idea of reducing and completely removing these missiles. We do not support the idea of modernizing them or increasing their number. We are prepared to hold talks to eliminate our superiority in tactical missiles. Actually, we are proposing this. We support the idea of holding talks on tactical nuclear arms as a whole. That is, talks should be held not only on tactical missiles, in which we have superiority. The question of aircraft capable of carrying tactical nuclear

arms and the question of artillery units capable of firing shells armed with nuclear warheads should also be included in the talks. NATO has not accepted our proposals. It has opposed them.

[Idiz] NATO maintains the logic applied in the case of the INF agreement. That is, it takes the following view: "Let us go ahead with modernization and with deployment if necessary. Meanwhile, let us hold substantial talks on the question of supervised reductions."

In short, due to the present international conjuncture, the removal of nuclear arms within a short period of time seems to be a kind of illusion. The view in that regard is that there will need to be talks over many years, and that these talks will be difficult. Furthermore, a security gap must be avoided while talks are going on in this connection.

[Chernyshev] I understand their mentality. They wish to have nuclear arms as a deterrent force with a view to maintaining the element of intimidation and pressure. The NATO countries headed by the United States have said that they do not wish to relinquish nuclear arms until the end and that they do not support the idea of having them removed. The reason they have given for this is as follows: "Anything can happen in the future. Other countries may possess these arms and put forward their own conditions. Terrorists are included in this. In view of this, let us maintain nuclear arms to a certain degree. Let us establish peace and stability this way."

But the nuclear factor will remain. Consequently, the concept of temporary peace will arise. We are opposed to this. [passage omitted]

[Idiz] Turkey is attaching great importance to the question of modernizing conventional arms. For historical reasons, it wishes to establish its own defense industry. It wants to be more independent in that field. How do you assess Turkey's effort in that regard?

[Chernyshev] In general, the Armed Forces are involved in this procedure. This is unavoidable, but what is important is the question of limit. If the destructive capability of the arms which replace the old ones is a few times higher—and I would like to mention that the destructive capability of conventional arms is approaching that of nuclear arms at the present time—and if such a modernization is taking place close to our border, then we cannot ignore it. And again, if the Lance-2 missiles are brought forward, we shall not be able to ignore them either. If the question of aircraft capable of delivering new nuclear arms is raised, then this will attract our attention as well. We shall be forced to take the required measures if they exceed logical limits.

Naturally, all this will have an effect on our relations. Nevertheless, the factors which require wide-ranging modernization in armies are gradually diminishing. The level of danger is gradually falling. We are putting

measures into effect to reduce our Armed Forces by 500,000 men. We are also cutting the number of our tanks. Significant reductions are being made in our artillery units. We are unilaterally moving to withdraw tactical nuclear missiles from a number of Warsaw Pact countries. We are taking measures to convert our units in the GDR into a defensive force. We are withdrawing the units which have an offensive capability from that country. According to a major plan, we are changing our military doctrine to comply with the concept of defense. We have proposed to hold talks on tactical nuclear arms. You judge for yourselves the way the modernization of nuclear and conventional arms can be assessed in light of all this.

[Idiz] Looking at bilateral relations at this point, how would you assess the development of relations between your country and Turkey during the past few years? What is your approach in that regard?

[Chernyshev] We have arrived at two simple conclusions on the question of bilateral relations. The first is that we have to understand and respect the interests not only of the Soviet Union but also of the country that we are dealing with. The second is to respect the political preference of such a country. Through this approach we have begun to take positive steps together with the United States, the European countries, including Turkey, and our other neighbors. We have to accept Turkey as it is. We regard Turkey as a very important neighbor. Turkey is a big country, from the point of view of territory and population. It is not a small country. There is another point that cannot be denied. That is the fact that Turkey is developing at a fast pace. Furthermore, our countries are neighbors. In view of this, we must continuously think about how to exist in the future.

[Idiz] How have the developments which took place in your country during the past few years as a result of what you have described as the "new way of thinking" influenced your relations with Turkey?

[Chernyshev] For many years we regarded Turkey as a NATO member which had nuclear arms and as a country, which, as far as we were concerned, had a number of negative elements. Our approach was built on these negative elements. But our relations would have remained immobile had we considered only this aspect. We decided that we should turn the weight of our attention to elements which united us if we wished to develop our relations. Consequently, we are trying to broaden the sphere which unites the two countries as much as possible. While doing so, we are also trying to

reduce the sphere which separates the two countries. The points in politics and issues on which we share common views are not few. [passage omitted]

UN Seminar on Indian Ocean 'Peace Zone'
18070194z Moscow IZVESTIYA (Morning Edition) in Russian 1 Apr 89 p 4

[Article by M. Yusin, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Results of the Sochi Discussions"]

[Text] The International Seminar on Problems of Declaring the Indian Ocean a Peace Zone held under the aegis of the United Nations was concluded in Sochi. Three full work days lay behind it.

Many a lance was broken over the ticklish topic: How many bases should one country or another have in the Indian Ocean, and what in general can we consider to be a military base? The representatives of the Western countries did not agree with the definition of this concept presented by the Soviet Union. In their opinion, the definition of a military base as "a territory leased from another state, having its own infrastructure for supplying the continued operation of the strike force located there" leads to the conclusion that only the American bases on the island of Diego-Garcia, in Kenya, Oman and Bahrain will be considered military bases, since the other military facilities in the Indian Ocean do not fit this definition.

Nevertheless, despite the arguments and differences of opinion, we were able to achieve proximity of views on certain key questions. The overwhelming majority of the speakers spoke out against excessive military presence in the Indian Ocean and saturation of the coastal waters with combat vessels, which creates an explosive situation in the region.

Our primary achievement is that some constructive ideas were born during the Sochi discussions. The fact that there were scientists and representatives of non-governmental organizations present among the seminar participants, along with professional diplomats, allowed us to achieve an important breakthrough in mutual understanding," the representative of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean and permanent UN representative from Sri Lanka D. Perer, who presided over the meetings, told me after the conclusion of the seminar. For the first time in many years we have held discussions which touched upon key questions, and not limited ourselves to declarations. I am in full agreement with the opinion of one of the meeting participants: In the last 3 days we have made a significant step toward the Colombo Conference."

DENMARK

Social Democratic Security Policy Spokesman Opposes SNF Modernization

36130056z Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish
25-26 Feb 89 pp 6-7

[Interview with Ritt Bjerregaard, SDP spokesman on security policy, by Jacob Andersen and Jorgen Dragsdahl; date and place not given: "Our Protest Quota at NATO Has Not Yet Been Used Up"; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Excerpt] There could just happen to be new security agreements, such as an agreement to modernize NATO's nuclear weapons. The Social Democrats [SDP] feel a greater loyalty to other socialist parties than to NATO, according to the party's new spokesman on security matters, Ritt Bjerregaard.

The number of Denmark's differences of opinion probably affect the amount of influence we have in NATO, but we may still have to distance ourselves from some NATO decisions, Social Democratic spokesman on security policy Ritt Bjerregaard said. Denmark's protest quota has not yet been used up.

As an example, Denmark cannot approve a so-called modernization of tactical nuclear weapons.

Behind the propensity toward differing opinions is a trend in Social Democratic security policy that is clearly expressed when she speaks of the often used term "NATO loyalty."

The primary loyalty of the Social Democrats is to other Social Democratic Parties in the member nations of the alliance. During the eighties, these parties have opposed the policies that the mainly Conservative NATO governments have pushed through.

Since it has become extremely difficult to force security policies on the government through parliament, now that the Radical Liberal Party has been given some cabinet posts, Ritt Bjerregaard now stresses the importance of "detente from below"—i.e., grassroots initiatives such as Next Stop Soviet Union, dialogue between parties in the East and West, and cultural exchanges, on the university level, for example. "I believe more in this type of thing than in parliamentary debates," she said and added with a smile, "But I am probably not supposed to say such things."

Not A Case Worker

With Ritt Bjerregaard as security policy spokesman, a position she assumed when Lasse Budtz stepped down, political strategy has taken a front seat to foreign policy expertise:

"If you want to know how many missiles are deployed where, you should ask someone else. I am a politician, not a case worker." This was her first advice to the interviewers from INFORMATION.

No one has ever doubted that Ritt Bjerregaard applies her mind to foreign policy. Her reputation for using cold reasoning has given rise to many nicknames, such as the "Ice Queen."

But an hour-long interview showed that her heart also helps shape her ideas on security policy. She was a very warm, relaxed person who was in excellent spirits.

At a time when peace movements were still controversial in many circles, she joined the Peace Fund. Her feeling of opposition to the traditional security policy elite was clear. This elite is not interested in a debate that could question official views.

"There is a large group of university people and journalists who keep up with these issues and are invited here and there and they convey the official views to the public."

In a democracy, they should counterbalance the official powers, but you indicate that they have been corrupted because they want to protect their access to information. Is this correct?

"Yes, they are some well-established groups. It is clear that they are. They try to monopolize the debate. But since 1979 some other groups have wanted a debate. We will do everything possible to maintain a broad debate, but it is difficult."

Low Profile

Since the elections last year, the Social Democrats have had no confrontations with the government on security policy, even though the government has quietly changed the course that the foreign minister has held for years—despite sharp criticism from the majority.

In many ways, the situation is reminiscent of the period before the agreement on the deployment of 572 NATO nuclear weapons.

In his book "Socialdemokratiets atomvabenpolitik 1945-88" [The Social Democrats' Policy on Nuclear Weapons 1945-88], researcher Erik Boel described the party's policy during the sixties and a large part of the seventies as a reactive attempt to reduce the demands that unpleasant decisions be made.

According to Boel, there was a change in 1977-78. Their policy on nuclear weapons became outwardly oriented and "guided by the belief that small countries have both a duty and the ability to work toward disarmament in the international arena."

He also pointed out, however, that there are still remnants of the old policy—primarily because of pressure from the nonsocialist parties and from the United States.

Will the Social Democrats now make peace with the ruling parties and keep a low international profile?

No To Nuclear Weapons

Ritt Bjerregaard had not read Erik Boel's book, but she was familiar with its main ideas.

She had seen a clear "intensification" of the Social Democrats' policy on nuclear weapons during the eighties and she said that the party's rejection of nuclear weapons was definitely a matter of principle. They were against modernization of tactical nuclear weapons because, "We are against nuclear weapons and this is a chance for us to point this out."

The Social Democrats have kept a lower profile since the elections due to conditions outside the party itself.

New Protests

She also pointed out that critical public interest varied considerably from time to time.

"When the official agencies are doing nothing, the pressure increases. Then the peace movements can be mobilized. Various proposals may be made at such times."

"At present, something is being done through formal channels. Certain negotiations are under way. Some results will be achieved. As a result, there is a certain lull while people wait to see how far they will go."

"If a decision is made to modernize the tactical nuclear weapons, then we will see a period of renewed activity."

The Decision

But just what is a decision?

In an article last Friday in INFORMATION, researcher Jorgen Christensen pointed out that NATO had made a number of partial decisions in this connection, so that Denmark is suddenly caught up in old obligations on which parliament has not been informed and over which parliament has had no control.

"I am talking about decisions in the political meaning. There must be a situation in which the foreign ministers say 'yes' or 'no' to something. But it is true that there is a system in which partial decisions are made all along. It cannot be said that the decisive decision is made at a particular time."

"One book I enjoyed reading tremendously is David Jens Adler's 'Det europaeiske Teater' [The European Theater] on the history of medium-range missiles. It gives an excellent description of how such decisions are made."

But Denmark must live up to alliance decisions when the final "yes" is said after the many small "yeses" from officials that have been approved by the ministers, is this not correct?

"This is clearly the case when you are not in governmental power. In the opposition, you cannot influence the administration. It is wrong to believe you can do so. It was not even the case when we approved resolutions. It has been extremely frustrating to approve something and then find out that many of the plans were handled in a different manner. You can be active in the appropriate NATO agencies only when you are in the government."

Socialists Prepared For Battle

But is being in governmental power really worth that much? A Social Democratic government was snubbed in 1979 when it proposed that NATO postpone a decision on the missiles.

"I believe we learned a lot that time. The Social Democratic Parties will not be taken by surprise this time. After all, we are meeting frequently. I know what the Norwegians and the Belgians are going to say at NATO. I know where the German Social Democrats, the SPD, stand. This time they cannot manipulate us by playing one of us against the other, as they did in 1979. We are in close contact and we agree on our positions."

"The problem is that the nonsocialist governments are in the majority. If a decision is made to modernize these weapons, then Norway and Belgium will be in a difficult situation with regard to the NATO establishment. This is why it is so important to have the right parties in power."

Ellemann's Guarantee

But political decisions have been evaded in the past, for example in connection with the new American chemical weapons. That can happen again and it is apparently what Ellemann-Jensen is striving for with regard to the short-range nuclear weapons. What can you do if you are simply not asked?

"Then it will be a question of when we want to say in parliament that the time has come for the foreign minister to discuss the matter."

"During consultations with the foreign minister in the Security Policy Committee we have pointed out that we disagree with him when he says that this must be done gradually. We have said that we want him to take a position and that we will put a stop to this. It is a question of timing."

"There is no doubt that we are against it, but we will gladly arrange a process whereby the Radicals become part of a majority. That will mean that the security policy of the government we have now will become less public. For we cannot make the Radicals go public."

Ritt Bjerregaard believes it is not probable that NATO can avoid taking a political position on the so-called nuclear modernization.

"There are many indications that the United States needs a decision and that is a great advantage to us. Congress does not want to allocate the money to produce nuclear missiles without such a NATO decision."

Influence Of Chance

Why is it precisely the missile part of the so-called modernization process that is so important politically, since this modernization is so much more extensive?

"I believe a lot of this is a result of chance. It depends on how the political process of making decisions works. Unlike people who write about this or that aspect of the system, the important thing for us politicians is what questions will be decided by political decisions. We are not case workers."

Can you conduct politics by chance?

"We do it all the time."

Thus, the Social Democrats have a two-track strategy, according to Ritt Bjerregaard.

They want to find out how much influence they can have when they work with the government. At the same time, they want to remain in close contact with other Social Democratic governments so that they can influence, for example, what the Norwegians say at NATO. The internal political strategy is "extremely difficult at present." The European strategy is "working quite well."

Demands For SNU

The Social Democrats are pursuing the Danish part of their strategy primarily in the Security Policy Committee of parliament. The party has been promised by the foreign minister that it can order whatever analyses it wants from the government's Security and Disarmament Policy Committee, SNU. SNU's analysis of the nuclear modernization is scheduled to be ready in early April.

"This will be a test case. We have stated clearly that we do not want SNU to present us with a consensus paper. What we need is a presentation of the various views and arguments that have been made by both established and less established people. This is what we expect and we will see how far we can go."

"We need SNU's paper because there are many opposing arguments in this debate and I am always happy to see papers that raise questions. We must see which arguments are viable and what they can lead to. There is no guarantee that we can gain the support of the majority for our view. Perhaps, with a paper of this kind, we can reach a joint position that we can be sure will be presented to NATO."

"We differ in this way from the SF [Socialist People's Party]. We would rather make the government do something at NATO than simply express our differences with Uffe Ellemann."

Real Politician

Do you believe that the foreign minister has become more accommodating since the Radicals joined the government?

"I believe he is enough of a real politician to understand that he must give some consideration to the Radicals, if they are not to become too difficult for him to handle. We are making the most of this."

But he has said that the nuclear modernization is simply a step in a natural process.

"He has stated quite clearly in committee that he has given definite instructions to the Danish officials who are involved in the preparations. They cannot obligate Denmark to abide by later decisions or partial decisions. We will point this out if Denmark agrees to any partial decisions from which we must later back down."

Denmark Not An Island

Denmark decides itself! That was the slogan of the Social Democrats last year. Some people objected to this, saying that it was also true of other countries and, to the extent that Denmark is dependent on them, we must adapt ourselves to them to a certain degree. In a later article, Ritt Bjerregaard described a state of dependence based on the fact that Denmark is a "part of the north German plateau."

She denied that there was any contradiction between the election slogan and this statement. The slogan was a result of a specific situation in which the United States ambassador had interfered in Danish politics. But "Danish foreign policy must always be related to German foreign policy because of our geographic location."

"Denmark is not an island in the world that does not need to consider others. I am a supporter and, moreover, a defender of membership in NATO as the smartest and most secure policy. But even a small country has the right to self-determination if it wants to say 'yes' or 'no' in specific decisions."

"We ourselves determine whether we want to belong to NATO and its nuclear planning group. There are some things that other people want that are of great importance to us. We do not have the same chance to speak up, but we are also part of a process and we can make our voice heard."

NATO Loyalty

Does the term "NATO loyalty" mean anything to you?

"Not unless you explain it."

For many people, unity and mutual loyalty within NATO is the basis of all security policy.

"We feel a greater loyalty and a more active sense of cooperation with the other Social Democratic Parties, such as in the Scandilux group and in Eurosouth. We make sure our policies on security are in agreement with those of other Social Democratic and socialist parties, not necessarily with those of Margaret Thatcher, Kohl, or whatever other Conservative governments belong to NATO. Our loyalty is on a different political plane."

"With respect to the Eastern countries, the Social Democratic Parties clearly have a greater interest than the Conservative governments in bilateral contacts. It is part of an active security policy to have contacts with both the communist parties and opposition groups." [passage omitted]

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Press Surveys NATO Differences on Missiles
AU2704195489 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0505 GMT 27 Apr 89

[From the Press Review]

[Text] The SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG comments on the missile discussion: Nobody can win this guerrilla warfare in the alliance. It is true that nobody is strong enough to have his way: The Anglo-Americans [as received] cannot modernize without the Germans, Bonn cannot negotiate on the missiles without Washington and London. Everybody can push through his veto, but not his will. A tempest in a teapot? Not exactly. At Genscher's instigation, the government has embarked on a risky game. On the one hand, it has openly challenged two of its main allies; on the other hand, the two of them will not forget so quickly that the German foreign minister wants to establish a continental European alliance against them. Thus the subsequent attempt to cultivate the partnership during the lightning visit to Washington was of little avail. Therefore, Bonn—Kohl as well as Genscher—has to ask itself whether they did not trigger off the wrong conflict at the wrong time, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG states.

MUENCHNER MERKUR in its editorial criticizes the Federal Government's attitude even more openly. There we read: The aversion of U.S. President Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher to negotiations is well founded. If Moscow were to perseveringly exercise pressure on the Western public, the fatal upper limit of zero could easily result from equal upper limits. London and Washington have stated their objections clearly and convincingly. Because of election tactics, the coalition has embarked on a course that is dangerous to security policy. Moreover, for these reasons FRG citizens might also fail to appreciate the prevention of a compromise with the NATO partners, the MUENCHNER MERKUR states.

The RHEINZEITUNG from Koblenz holds the opposite opinion: Mrs Thatcher wants to point out to us that the Genscher-Kohl policy of giving Gorbachev a chance at disarmament before introducing new missiles is completely wrong. For Margaret Thatcher and George Bush want to deploy the new Lance successor missiles—which have a range of 480 km—in our country as fast as possible. Mrs Thatcher should not try to teach us manners in the divided Germany. The Federal Government has to continue its proper course: Before rearmament, negotiations have to take place. The president's clear words adjust the allies' crooked coordinates. Weizsaecker's plain words carry weight all over the world, the RHEINZEITUNG states.

Two more commentaries also deal with the president's role. The NEUE PRESSE from Hannover points out: Once again, Richard von Weizsaecker has to support the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Christian Social Union [CSU]. His surprisingly open appeal to Europeans to confidently and independently formulate their own position on the rearmament of short-range nuclear missiles has outside and inside effects. Those CDU/CSU politicians for whom it is a tradition to repeat every one of the Pentagon's armament wishes can also take new heart from this. In fact, the fear of isolation within the alliance is completely unfounded. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Greece, and Spain have taken sides with Bonn. Apparently the people of the European Continent fear nuclear disarmament and the Soviet tanks less than the supreme whipper-in, Margaret Thatcher, the NEUE PRESSE states.

The KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER draws the following conclusions: What increasingly strains Bonn's partnership with the United States and Great Britain is no longer a quarrel, it is a menacing crisis. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why even the FRG president comments on the question of whether and when the U.S. short-range missiles deployed on German soil will be replaced by new and more powerful weapons. Weizsaecker says it is a fairy-tale that the Federal Government is isolated among its partners because it opposes Washington and London's armament zeal. These words are as weighty as the exhortation that the Americans and

Britons, as representatives without the power of attorney, should not assert such things. Has the president exceeded his limits? asks the KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER.

'Fissures' in Atlantic Alliance over 'Anglo-Saxon Decrees' Seen

LD0105024289 *Cologne Deutsche Welle in English*
0110 GMT 1 May 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] As long as the Kremlin's leaders pounded their fists, wagged their fingers, and rattled their sabres, the Western alliance stuck together like tar and feathers. But now that Mikhail Gorbachev has shed the confrontational posture of his predecessors and turned instead to the domestic renewal of his underdeveloped country, the bastions of staunch Atlantic allies are showing fissures.

On the surface at least, it appears as though everything hinges on whether America's aging nuclear Lance missiles should be replaced or included in the next round of East-West disarmament talks. In reality, the question is a more fundamental one of Western strategy for deterrence and defense. [passage omitted]

But beyond all military considerations, there's still an even more fundamental question. Just how is the West supposed to react to a Soviet Union which is no longer flying under the banner of confrontation? It is an outrageous distortion to claim that Western Europe would be denuclearized if land-based missile systems were done away with. Left behind would be some 1,000 for-the-most-part recently modernized nuclear artillery grenades, which would level Germany in a worst-case scenario. For that reason alone these should be withdrawn without waiting for a Soviet counterproposal. [passage omitted]

Nowhere on the planet is there such a high concentration of troops and weapons as on East and West German soil—1.5 million men and thousands of nuclear weapons. This is absurd in an age when tensions between the two blocs have noticeably decreased. Today's rule of thumb is to decrease military superiority through disarmament of the stronger side and not by arming the side which feels inferior.

And not to be forgotten is the fact that the continuing need for defenses to prod the detente process along has to be linked with regular efforts at disarmament in order to be accepted by the general public. In short, disarmament in one sector must not be compromised nor threatened by an arms buildup in another sector. The fissures in the Atlantic alliance could become dangerous if Anglo-Saxon decrees become a substitute for dialogue.

Spokesman Rejects Sununu Comments on Missiles

LD0105113689 *Hamburg DPA in German* 1112 GMT
1 May 89

[EXCERPT] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Genscher referred to the special German situation in an interview with FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Tuesday's edition) [2 May]. The attitude of the Germans has to have "special importance in the alliance because Lance missiles are on our ground and because we make the biggest conventional contribution, through the Bundeswehr, for joint Western security." Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Greece, and Italy are on Bonn's side in the issue of negotiations and short-range missiles because of earlier NATO decisions.

"It would be completely incomprehensible were one to negotiate about everything else but not about short-range missiles," Genscher said. "Disarmament should not neglect any area." Genscher also warned against individual coalition politicians putting the entire government policy on this issue into question.

Government spokesman Hans Klein on Monday rejected comments from White House Chief of Staff John Sununu that the Germans would lose 9:7 with their missile concept in NATO. "I don't find it good," Klein told DPA, "if there is talk of losers and winners at such a stage of internal discussions, as if it were a football match." [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Genscher Interviewed on SNF Modernization

AU0205141289 *Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German* 2 May 89 p 4

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Eghard Moerbitz, "after the 30 April meeting between Kohl and Thatcher": "Word for Word in Agreement"—place not given]

[Text] [Moerbitz] Mr Minister, according to the government declaration, Bonn will not permit the "double approach" of its security policy, namely defense capability and disarmament, to "be amputated in one direction or another." How are you going to implement your five-point plan within NATO, considering that only 1 day after the government declaration, politicians from the Christian Socialist Union have quite openly accused you of selling off German interests?

[Genscher] It is not my five-point plan, but that of the FRG Government. Chancellor Kohl has presented it in the Bundestag and all ruling parties have agreed on this plan. The credibility of German foreign policy and the representation of our national interests demand that the government's policy be emphatically supported by all politicians within the coalition and not be challenged. We will not permit anybody to disregard the concluded agreements. The relevant points which the chancellor

presented in the government declaration were agreed upon word by word. There are no loopholes! I expect this joint position to be supported by all. We will only be able to present our stance convincingly if we prove this joint position in the talks within the alliance.

[Moerbitz] So you still believe that you will be able to convince the United States and Great Britain of the necessity of an early negotiating mandate before the NATO summit at the end of this month?

[Genscher] Such negotiations were considered by the alliance as far back as 1987 and 1988. Thus, we are not talking about a new demand which we and other partners within the alliance are making, but about the implementation of an intention that was supported within the alliance by two important decisions of the alliance. It should now be possible to find a way. I have no doubts about the good will of all the alliance partners concerned. The German voice must certainly be given special importance, because the Lance missiles are deployed on our soil and because, with the Bundeswehr, we make the greatest conventional contribution to the joint security of the West.

[Moerbitz] You managed to win Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Greece, and Italy over to your side, as you declared. Are you trying to split NATO into "continental Europeans" and "Atlantic states" ["Atlantiker"]?

[Genscher] We did not have to win over these countries because, on the basis of the 1987 and 1988 NATO decisions, they have shared our opinion from the very beginning. It would be completely incomprehensible to negotiate everything but short-range missiles. Disarmament must not leave out any sphere. We are trying to preserve the unity of NATO, based on the decisions of 1987 and 1988. Only an alliance that acts jointly and in agreement will be able to guarantee the security in the future. Only an alliance that acts jointly and in agreement—as in the case of the agreement on intermediate-range missiles—will also achieve disarmament that builds security in the other spheres.

[Moerbitz] Nevertheless, you make many conservatives in the United States and here suspicious, because every now and then you use the term "the tide has turned" when you refer to Mikhail Gorbachev. Are you naive or do you even want to make your voters understand that the Bonn coalition will not survive another radical tidal wave at the 18 June EC elections?

[Genscher] I have to issue an urgent warning against making foreign policy the subject of tactical games of domestic policy. When what is at stake is overcoming the division of Europe and using the historic chance which Gorbachev's policy offers, we have to act like statesmen and not play games of party tactics. This requires new thinking on all sides. Through dialogue and cooperation we have to achieve a profound new structure in West-East relations. Through disarmament we have to create

more security. Why should it harm Western interests if the USSR, as a result of negotiations, also reduces its superiority in the field of short-range missiles, and if contractual agreements prevent a new arms race? This means that disarmament that is made irreversible by agreement creates more security!

[Moerbitz] Are you sure that the voters think along the same lines, that they will attend the 18 June elections, and vote accordingly?

[Genscher] As far as the EC parliamentary elections are concerned, I am optimistic, because particularly now it shows that European union is attractive and that the advantages for our country cannot be overlooked. So why should the citizens support parties that oppose the process of European unification? After all, our membership in the EC and the Western alliance is also an irrevocable expression of our decision to choose freedom and democracy.

[Moerbitz] Does Gorbachev's course make the current negotiations with Warsaw easier?

[Genscher] The positive overall development of East-West relations also has a favorable impact on the German-Polish relationship. Gorbachev's reform policy and the reform policy in Poland can be seen as parallel developments, considering the conditions in the two countries. The positive assessment of the Soviet reform policy by Lech Walesa confirms this. The year 1989 is certainly a special year for Germans and Poles, because Hitler's attack on Poland 50 years ago marked the beginning of World War II. This historic and moral dimension determines the policy of both countries. This is why I am so optimistic....

[Moerbitz]even as far as the trips you have planned for 1989 are concerned?

[Genscher] Well, we will have to do everything to avoid having the future road blocked by unnecessary arguments and petty complaints. This year's visits to Poland by the FRG chancellor and the FRG president will certainly be an expression of our responsibility for peace in Europe.

SPD's Bahr Calls SNF Modernization Discussion 'Absurd'

*LD0205152989 Hamburg DPA in German
1451 GMT 2 May 89*

[Text] Cologne (DPA)—The SPD's [Social Democratic Party of Germany] disarmament expert, Egon Bahr, has described the latest missile discussions as absurd and taken the view that NATO has no disarmament plan. "The discussion is politically, militarily, and psychologically absurd," Bahr said today in the Westdeutscher Rundfunk [WDR] magazine program "Monitor." New missiles are not needed but what is needed is an answer to Gorbachev's disarmament plans.

"NATO has fabulous ideas for continual arming but no plan for disarmament," the WDR press office quoted the SPD politician as saying. "It must prove that it is willing and capable of disarmament, otherwise it will stagger into a truly fundamental crisis." According to "Monitor," in spite of the present debate about the Lance missile "other missile systems" are being "modernized" unnoticed by the public. The new antimissile missile "Patriot", because of its short range, holds "the danger that Germany could become a nuclear battlefield."

Extracts from Bahr's comments on "Monitor" were prereleased.

Rear Admiral Discusses NATO, Nuclear Strategy
AU0205201489 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
2 May 89 pp 24

[Article by Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaehling: "Our Existence is Immediately Affected"]

[Text] The nuclear age is coming to an end. No opponent who is highly armed with nuclear weapons can any longer be credibly threatened with the use of nuclear weapons against him. Thus, the NATO strategy is facing a dilemma.

"The current security-and military-political discussion is dominated by the question about the purpose of nuclear weapons not only in Europe but in the whole world," said General Wolfgang Altenburg, currently chairman of the NATO Military Committee. "For us in the FRG, these questions are all the more urgent, because another war would not be a question of victory or defeat, but would immediately affect our existence."

The "renaissance of the conventional" in the sphere of defense, which one can notice in many recent political statements, permits only one plausible explanation: NATO's doctrine of deterrence, whose efficiency depends on convincing any possible opponent that nuclear weapons can be used even in a conventional war, has plunged into a crisis. Politicians and high-ranking NATO and Warsaw Pact officials have now declared that a nuclear war can no longer be won and can thus no longer be led. Even the assumption that a war that was begun conventionally could be ended by NATO with the single selective use of a few nuclear warheads, meets with increasing skepticism.

NATO's real dilemma lies in the increasing rejection of the use of nuclear weapons as a military option in a war on the one hand, and in NATO's continued adherence to the doctrine of threatening an opponent with a nuclear first-strike. To be able to live with this situation, the FRG has attributed a new role to nuclear weapons in the past few years, namely that of "political weapons." Says General Altenburg:

Nuclear weapons play a leading role in deterrence. They have a clearly political function. By their deterring effect they have to prevent war. In case deterrence fails, they have to end a conflict which has already begun as quickly as possible, in which case the damage has always to be minimized. The option of a nuclear first-strike should be available as a political tool... with the objective of reestablishing deterrence and ending a war, and not to prolong a war when there are no more conventional armed forces left. Those who hold such a view and regard nuclear weapons only as highly sophisticated artillery, have failed to understand the purpose and role of nuclear weapons in our strategy.

Consistently, General Altenburg has long held the view that a fraction of the present arsenals of nuclear weapons in Europe is sufficient to fulfill their political function.

As far back as 1984 in an interview in SPIEGEL, after he was asked whether he could imagine a situation in which he would agree to the proposal to use nuclear battlefield weapons which might hit FRG territory, General Hans-Joachim Mack, until recently one of NATO's deputy commanders in chief, Europe, said: "If the use of nuclear weapons was to be considered at all, I would not agree to the first use of nuclear battlefield weapons."

The claim that nuclear battlefield weapons are also "political weapons" is a conspicuous contrast to reality, as is shown by the stocking up of nuclear ammunition, the methods of control and use of these weapons, and operational planning.

In the course of modernization, nuclear battlefield weapons have become increasingly "handy" and militarily useful. The contradiction between the nuclear weapons military and political role is becoming more and more obvious in Europe.

While the German General Mack noted that the use of nuclear battlefield weapons is out of the question as far as he is concerned, former NATO Commander in Chief U.S. General Rogers said: "Today we have to resort to nuclear weapons under all conditions."

NATO cannot leave such contradictions unresolved for long. The German generals formulate these things cautiously. However, they are obviously convinced that there is no reasonable military option for nuclear weapons in Europe....

As a surprise for friend and foe alike, the U.S. president dropped the NATO strategy which is still valid today by a statement he made in March 1983. Of course, at a glance, the idea to defeat the nuclear scourge of mankind, is attractive and tempting. However, the real political objective of a space-based strategic defense system is connected with a number of dangerous consequences.

For the first time in NATO history, the agreed strategy was discredited at a time when the means for a new strategy were not even in sight. The NATO partners had not been consulted. The U.S. President's lone decision to give military research a significant domestic policy thrust by introducing SDI, has plunged NATO into a deep crisis of confidence.

Respective of the prospects of implementation following a phase of several years of research, the United States continues to pursue the objective of developing an antiballistic missile defense system. The European NATO partners who do not have their own national nuclear weapons are concerned that they will in the future possibly live in a zone of "less security." Surprisingly, the U.S. Administration has also stated moral reasons for SDI. Thereby it has upgraded church criticism of nuclear deterrence. For moral-theological reasons, they refused to issue a long-term blank check for a philosophy of deterrence that is based on the threat to use weapons of mass destruction. They clearly stress the necessity to overcome the idea of relying on means of mass destruction for our security. Catholic military Bishop Dr Elmar Maria Kredel said in September 1986: "The Catholic Church does not consider deterrence a secure path to peace."

In addition to lacking confidence in the controllability of escalation, once nuclear weapons have been used, people are simply afraid of such weapons. It may be that this fear cannot be rationally explained or justified. However, it is supported and enhanced by statements of socially respected groups who have a certain authority, on the dangers and consequences of nuclear war—expert reports on "nuclear winter" as a possible consequence of a nuclear war, or on the expected disastrous injuries and late sequelae for which according to quite a large group of doctors there are neither sensible provisions, nor promising kinds of treatment.

There has been a new certainty since Chernobyl: Beyond borders and beyond different systems, the people are linked by the wish to live in peace, and they share a "community of a remaining nuclear risk." It has become alarmingly clear to many people how small the world is measured by the expansion and the rate at which radioactively contaminated clouds and air currents spread.

Do we not have to consider that the people will soon refuse to back a strategy of the Atlantic Alliance that puts its stakes on nuclear weapons, because they no longer accept this "remaining risk"?

SPD-Polish Joint Working Group on Baltic Confidence-Building Measures
LD0205192889 Hamburg DPA in German
1525 GMT 2 May 89

[Text] Ploen (DPA)—The joint working group of the SPD parliamentary group and the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR] has expressed its determination to make an important contribution to confidence-building security structures in the Baltic area.

On the fringe of a conference in Ploen in Schleswig-Holstein, the deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Professor Horst Ehmke, and the deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Parliament, Ryszard Wojna, today said that, apart from gradual disarmament, military-political transparency must be increased. As confidence-building measures, joint maneuver regulations and a continuation of political dialogue between East and West are necessary.

At times, representatives from the USSR, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are also taking part in the conference, which is to last several days.

FRANCE

FRG's Genscher Explains View on SNF Modernization
LD0205141589 Hamburg DPA in German
1358 GMT 2 May 89

[Text] Paris (DPA)—In Paris today, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher explained to his French counterpart Roland Dumas Bonn's attitude toward the modernization of the U.S. short-range missiles based in the Federal Republic. Genscher reported on his visit to Washington and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government statement on the missile issue.

Afterward, Genscher said NATO should set a "signal of unity" at its summit conference at the end of May. He said that he is very satisfied that Paris shares Bonn's concern about the Warsaw Pact's superiority in short-range missiles. He also referred to the statements by French President Francois Mitterrand who had not overemphasized the decision on missile modernization.

Dumas advocated that attitudes within NATO should be harmonized. He added, however, that France will not become active on this issue since it is not integrated in NATO's military command structure.

ITALY

FRG's Kohl Arrives To Discuss SNF Modernization

To Meet Prime Minister de Mita
LD0205090389 Hamburg DPA in German
0842 GMT 2 May 89

[Excerpt] Rome (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl arrived in Rome Tuesday for talks with the Italian Government. The exchange of views between Kohl and the Italian head of government, Ciriaco de Mita, is to center on the modernization of nuclear short-range missiles and on disarmament. [passage omitted]

De Mita Explains Italian Stance

LD2804224789 Rome International Service in Italian 1730 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] The attainment of significant results during the Vienna negotiations for conventional disarmament alone can open the road to negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles. This is the way the president of the Council of Ministers, Ciriaco de Mita, explained to Mrs Thatcher the Italian position on the reduction of short-range missiles—an issue which has caused a split among the NATO allies. Meeting the British prime minister in London, De Mita basically stressed the views announced yesterday by Minister Andreotti in the Senate, which were approved by the House almost unanimously.

The question of negotiations on tactical arms is simpler if it is placed within the context of a process aiming at equilibrium, De Mita stressed during his meeting with the press, but it becomes more difficult if it forms an element causing a split. Answering a journalist who asked whether we can say there is an Italian attempt to mediate between the German stance and that of Britain and the United States, the president of the Council of Ministers replied: It is not my job to bring the stands together. We are not talking about going in the direction of universal disarmament, but of attaining an equilibrium at a lower level.

De Mita Backs Kohl on Missiles

LD0205150589 Hamburg DPA in German 1433 GMT 2 May 89

[Text] Rome (DPA)—Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita has assured Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of his support in the conflicts in NATO over the modernization of nuclear short-range missiles. But at a news conference in Rome today following their meeting, Kohl and De Mita said they are confident that a "reasonable compromise", acceptable to all, will be found during the NATO summit meeting at the end of May in Brussels. "We are willing for a compromise and I also see a good chance of it," Kohl said.

'Assures' Kohl

LD0205161689 Hamburg DPA in German 1551 GMT 2 May 89

[Excerpts] Rome/Paris (DPA)—The Federal Government's position toward the modernization of U.S. short-range missiles in the Federal Republic met with understanding today in Rome and Paris. In Rome, Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita assured Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of his support in the argument within NATO. [passage omitted]

The issue of modernizing short-range nuclear missiles is being "forced unnecessarily," De Mita said. If an agreement were to come about on reducing conventional weapons with the Warsaw Pact, "then a reduction in

tactical nuclear weapons should not be ruled out," Italy's Christian Democrat head of government said. A decision on the renewal of short-range nuclear weapons should not be indefinitely postponed, but does not have to be made until 1992. [passage omitted]

Kohl, who arrived in Rome this morning for an approximately 10-hour visit, stressed the Federal Government's will to compromise. However, their alliance partners must understand that the Federal Government is interested in a reduction in weapons which, in the event of war, would primarily affect Germans.

Kohl stressed that the Federal Republic was firmly anchored in the Western Alliance. "The bond with the West is part of our *raison d'etat*.... We are not wanderers between worlds.... Neutralism is not a policy that secures peace and freedom." The "two" pillars of German foreign policy were European political integration and its firm ties to NATO. [quotation marks as received]

The Federal Republic wants a "strong NATO but sensible talks on disarmament as well." Kohl said that he has no illusions about the possibilities for and the limits of disarmament but the changes in the Soviet Union are a reality. "The idea and the spirit of freedom are celebrating triumphs, the idea of human rights and openness is making progress."

"A document must be passed that would continue to guarantee NATO's strength, force, and common ground" at the NATO summit in Brussels, the chancellor said. "We want both: NATO's strength and its disarmament capability." [passage omitted]

Expects 'Compromise' at NATO

LD0205184989 Rome International Service in Italian 1730 GMT 2 May 89

[Excerpts] German Chancellor Kohl is on a visit to Italy. The visit forms part of the consultations between European partners on the sensitive question of the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. Rodolfo Fiorilla has been following the meeting between Kohl and Prime Minister De Mita.

[Fiorilla] There is a basic view shared by the Italian and German Governments on foreign policy concerning the Atlantic Alliance and the process of European political integration. This was underlined by Prime Minister De Mita at the end of a meeting with Chancellor Kohl at the Chigi Palace. We spoke of important questions, De Mita said, in connection with the forthcoming NATO meeting in Brussels, the European Council in Madrid, and the Paris conference of the seven Western most industrialized nations.

As for Chancellor Kohl, in reconfirming his country's commitment to NATO, he hoped that significant progress in the disarmament process would be made. It is a process which, in his view, must also apply to missiles whose range goes up to 500 km. [passage omitted]

The Italian prime minister said that he shared Kohl's expectations for a possible compromise at the next NATO meeting in Brussels. De Mita said the following with respect to the ongoing negotiations on conventional disarmament [as heard]:

[Begin De Mita recording] When we reach an agreement on conventional weapons, reconsidering the current balance in tactical nuclear weapons is not ruled out, must not be ruled out. Should, at the next NATO meeting, this reasoning prevail, and should no one persist in wanting to preempt the results [of these negotiations], I do not think that there should be, there must not be any major disagreement. [end recording]

FRG Press Views Kohl-De Mita Discussions
AU0305114489 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0500 GMT 3 May 89

[From the press review]

[Text] The FRG press today comments on yesterday's meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita. BADISCHE ZEITUNG, published in Freiburg, states: It became clear in Rome that the German-Italian meeting is by no means to be understood as opposition to Britain or the United States. For this reason, Italy is extremely cautious and extraordinarily realistic in the current debate. This meeting has not produced a readiness to fight, but a willingness to achieve understanding: Compromise was the word that was most frequently used by the two heads of government in talks with journalists. Italy could play a key role in this connection. Contrary to the FRG, Italy has suggested making talks on missiles conditional on positive results in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons. This formula should be acceptable for both Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher.

WESTFALENPOST, published in Hagen, writes: The chancellor met with understanding and support in Rome for the German position on missiles. Genscher met with understanding in Paris but received only vague support. If the advertising campaign is successful, a majority of allied states—certainly not the strongest ones—might back Kohl and Genscher in the end. What seems to be an opposition between many and a few, however, is already being seen as a conflict between Bonn on the one side and Washington and London on the other side. The situation of the alliance is no longer the same as described by Genscher after his return from the United States. A compromise will certainly be found that will allow the Brussels anniversary summit at the end of May to go off fairly smoothly.

RHEINISCHE POST, published in Duesseldorf, comes to the following conclusion: One must admit that the public's view of the recent controversy is not exactly favorable. The chancellor and vice chancellor are hectically paying visits to allied states—one went to Rome, the other to Paris—in order to gain support for their position on the missile issue. Old Adenauer would be surprised at the style that his grandchild Kohl has to adopt in the foreign policy sphere in order to regain the upper hand in domestic policy. However, nobody can really object to Kohl and Genscher acting as their own special ambassadors in an extremely delicate situation of the Western defense alliance. The era of old cabinet policy belongs to the past anyway.

SPAIN

Foreign Minister Ordóñez Interviewed on Spanish SNF Stance
LD0205003589 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
2100 GMT 1 May 89

[From the "Twenty-Four Hours" program]

[Excerpts] The summit at which NATO will celebrate its 40th anniversary, scheduled for the end of this month in Brussels, is under cross-fire from the internal tensions caused by the possible modernization of the short-range nuclear missiles, above all the missiles based in the Federal Republic of Germany. [passage omitted]

Right now we have the Spanish foreign minister, Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez, on the line. Good evening.

[Ordóñez] Good evening.

[Correspondent, in studio] Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez, are we on the verge of a profound crisis in NATO?

[Ordóñez] I don't think so. I think that the summit cannot just center on this question. Thought is being given and work is even being done already on a possible declaration for the end of May summit, namely the medium-term outlook of the alliance, and I think it would be absolutely absurd to center on a question which is, so far, difficult to resolve.

[Correspondent] Mr Fernandez Ordóñez, even if this is not the key subject at the forthcoming NATO summit, what is the position the Spanish Government will be taking to this summit?

[Ordóñez] I am saying that probably, if possible, the centering of the summit of prime ministers—heads of government—and heads of state on this matter will be avoided. We have already explained the Spanish position quite a few times. The last time was during the parliamentary debate on Spain's entry into the Western European Union. I stated clearly that our position is the

drastic reduction of nuclear-capable short-range missiles, if possible with negotiations, and secondly that we do not think it advisable to bring forward the modernization program now, and that naturally one must greatly take into account what they think in the Federal Republic of Germany, for whom the problem has become one of vast dimensions. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] In this context, Mr Fernandez Ordonez, what ability to exert an influence, what real weight, does a country like Spain, which supports the drastic reduction of these short-range nuclear missiles, have?

[Ordenez] Well, I explained to Baker when he was here in Madrid that that was our position. I have had the chance to speak to him on the telephone about it. In recent days, I have spoken on the telephone with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German minister, logically; and there have also been top level consultations throughout Europe and with the United States. The Spanish position is a position which seeks consensus but respects a country which houses the Lance missiles and which, as everyone knows, has huge misgivings about the modernization being rushed at the present time. I think that we must be respectful, that the alliance is based on positions of consensus, and that it is necessary to work to seek that consensus. That is the Spanish position and I think it is quite a sensible one. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Thank you very much, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, for answering this live call from "Twenty-Four Hours" and good night.

[Ordenez] Thank you, good night.

SWEDEN

Security Policy in View of Changed East-West Climate Debate

No Swedish Arms Cuts

36500079 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
5 Apr 89 p 12

[Article by Bjarne Stenquist: "Total Agreement on Security Policy—Defense Needed"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The positive developments in the Soviet Union and Europe cannot lead to a Swedish arms reduction. There was almost deafening agreement on that point on Tuesday [4 April] at a seminar on Swedish security policy, organized by the Central Organization of Salaried Employees [TCO] and the Myrdal Foundation.

"It is not statements but concrete measures that count in a security policy evaluation of our region," said Carl-Johan Aberg, chairman of the parliamentary Defense Committee, in his opening speech at the seminar.

Aberg pointed out that Sweden has been following defense appropriation tendencies in this part of the world.

"The 1984 Defense Committee noted that Sweden was one of the few countries where defense appropriations have declined as a share of the GNP [gross national product]. The plan was to change the trend in the 1987 Defense Act, but only a few months after it was adopted people realized there was a gap between goal and means."

"One of the new Defense Committee's first tasks is to propose changes in the planning system to prevent the same thing from happening again."

In his speech Aberg pursued the line expressed previously by such people as Under Secretary Pierre Schori and Defense Minister Roine Carlsson: Sweden cannot lower its guard.

By and large Sverker Astrom, former under secretary and Swedish ambassador in Paris, agreed with this assessment. But he said the changes in Soviet policy under Mikhail Gorbachev are of historic international significance. They have changed the basis of the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

"But we must not lose sight of the historical perspective. Other things can come up in Europe. Environmental pollution in the Soviet Union is so extensive that some scientists warn that parts of Siberia could become uninhabitable, forcing 30-40 million people to seek new homes. How far can the Soviet Union go with regard to allowing national separation tendencies? Several countries in the Middle East continue to develop nuclear weapons and if a nuclear war can start anywhere it is there," said Astrom.

Breaking Trend

"Developments in Eastern Europe also mean that the question of the division of Germany will come up again. We need to start thinking of ways to defuse this ticking time bomb in the heart of Europe before it goes off," Astrom said.

Therefore Astrom's conclusion was that a trend in international relations is about to be broken but that this requires continuity in Swedish security policy, supported by a defense system that is strong in relation to our circumstances.

Defense Committee Chairman Criticized

36500079 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
5 Apr 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense in EC Perspective"]

[Text] Time passes, security policy endures. That is not an entirely unfair description of the mood at Tuesday's seminar, organized by TCO and the Myrdal Foundation,

on how Sweden is dealing with a changing situation. Prior to the next Defense Act the government and leading Social Democrats do not want to encourage speculation about what a developing detente might entail.

As chairman of the current Defense Committee, Carl-Johan Aberg consistently backed the wait-and-see position adopted earlier by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, Defense Minister Roine Carlsson, and Under Secretary Pierre Schori. He had several supporters on the podium. And of course there is good reason for Sweden to avoid making any arms reduction changes in advance at any rate.

It is probably relevant at this point to refer to the modest little book, "Between East and West—Swedish Security Policy, 1945-88," by Uppsala researcher Erik Noreen that was used as the basis for the seminar. Realism continues to struggle with idealism in Swedish hearts.

Well, does the real Gorbachev's "new thinking" and what it has begun to involve mean nothing as far as Swedish foreign policy is concerned? Some researchers are beginning to get a little restless here, as Tuesday's seminar also demonstrated.

Kjell Goldmann is the person who has expressed himself most clearly. In his initial address to the Military Science Academy in December he called for a reappraisal of neutrality policy, partly to "maintain a review capability that can prove valuable at a later stage" and partly because he really believes that "the credibility of our intention to adhere to our neutrality policy should not be so great that it totally destroys the credibility of the possibility that it might be modified."

Here we are miles away from Social Democratic thinking, at any rate. It is currently based on the premise that Gorbachev and detente must be supported but that peace cannot be mortgaged; we must constantly keep our guard up.

What we have here is a historic international turning point, but we must not go too far in our euphoric optimism, according to a characteristic formulation presented at the seminar by Sverker Astrom. He considers it important to identify new threats (the Middle East as a possible nuclear hotbed, the German question, the nationalistic antagonisms breaking out in Eastern Europe) and Inga Thorsson put special emphasis on the North-South problem.

We need 5-10 years to evaluate the results of Gorbachev's policies, according to Nils Gylde of the Defense Ministry. Carl-Johan Aberg goes farther than that. Like the economist he is, he wants to update a long-range perspective for foreign policy change in the manner of Kondrachev's 50-year cycles.

But the Defense Committee chairman apparently feels it is very important for the next Defense Act to make neutrality credible in all quarters.

Aberg is worried that an editorial in the Social Democratic TIDEN will give the impression that Sweden is counting on NATO assistance to defend our territory in the event of an armed conflict between the major powers. Presumably he is also thinking of hints from the direction of the Supreme Commander [OB] that a weaker army involves taking risks, which could mean lowering the military guard in the south, because NATO would intervene there against an adversary's invasion operation. Naturally a Swedish Defense Act cannot be drawn up on the basis of this kind of argument either.

The way the Social Democrats talk about universal military service also points toward a continuation of a large Army structure. How will it be paid for?

But the most interesting thing is how Aberg and others seem to make an unnecessary connection between security policy goals and the Swedish debate on EC. The Social Democrats are defending themselves against a future negotiated solution in Brussels that could lead to restrictions in the entire foreign policy area; this was especially obvious in Inga Thorsson's warnings about how EC handles relations with the third world.

Obviously the government party does not want to discuss the possibility of a new and lasting East-West detente that could conceivably increase Sweden's freedom of movement. Instead of seeing a chance that a more unconditional Swedish EC policy might emerge gradually, the Social Democrats see a risk that the neutrality argument will lose credibility.

If the Social Democrats want to help check the continued erosion of Swedish defense, that is admirable. There are also good reasons to stress the importance of Swedish security policy as far as peaceful and stable relations in northern Europe are concerned. But thoughts about what the future may bring should not depend on how arguments are to be presented in Brussels.

UNITED KINGDOM

Thatcher Interviewed on European Forces Balance
52500031 London ITV Television Network in English
1800 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Interview with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by news presenter Peter Sissons in London on 7 April monitored in progress in the framework of Channel 4 "News"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Sissons] Now one of the most striking things Mr Gorbachev said in his Guildhall speech was: Any fears or misgivings about the Soviet military threat are groundless. Do you believe him?

[Thatcher] Well, when they have rather a lot of weapons and rather a lot of conventional forces—even after their reductions, their unilateral reductions, they still have twice as many as we have—that's a pretty big preponderance, and you cannot and should not ignore it, moreover...

[Sissons interrupts] He said we only had a superiority in NATO—or they only had a superiority in NATO in tanks.

[Thatcher] Well, I think that there will be some argument about the figures, and the place for that argument is the negotiations that are taking place in Vienna. Moreover, the Soviet Union has completed its program of modernization of nuclear weapons. We have not. Our short-range nuclear weapons, which will be modernized within the next few years, by the time they are modernized, they'll be 20 years old. Obsolete weapons don't deter. I accepted Mr Gorbachev's intentions are very...[changes thought] are good: But one cannot, in fact, create a defense system on good intentions. The world is unpredictable, terrible events happen—you always have to be prepared with a strong defense if you really and truly value the freedom and justice that we enjoy.

[Sissons] Now the Soviets appear to have warned you that insisting on modernizing NATO's short-range nuclear weapons could jeopardize or sabotage the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

[Thatcher] I doubt it. I doubt it very much, and the answer is they have just completed their modernization of short-range nuclear weapons. By the time ours are modernized, they'll have been in our armory for 230 years—that's not a very modern, up-to-date weapon. I don't believe the Soviet Union has any nuclear weapons in her armory which has been there for so long. They've updated them already.

[Sissons] Are there circumstances in which you would not insist upon modernization—or at least, not on deploying modernized weapons?

[Thatcher] You will not, in fact, get the United States making this particular one unless it would be agreed that it should be deployed in Europe—that's why it is important. If you are to deter war, you don't do it with obsolete weapons—whether your weapons are tanks, aircraft, antitank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, whatever they are, or nuclear weapons—they must be modernized: That is the surest defense to peace. I believe we need peace: Not a peace at any price, but with freedom and justice. We need peace to make progress—the world is unpredictable. No one could have said in 1930 we'd have been at war again in 1931. It came up very quickly. Modern weapons take a long time to design and produce. We must keep well defended and up-to-date: That is the surest guarantee of peace.

[Sissons] Well, yesterday, Mr Gerasimov was attacking Mr Brzezinski and Dr Kissinger for being the old style Cold War warriors, who are holding up progress towards disarmament. Is there not just a touch of that about you?

[Thatcher] No, there's a passionate believer in freedom under determination that it will be defended with a view to deterring anyone from attacking us. We can't do it alone—we need NATO. NATO and the nuclear deterrent, which is part of its strategy, has kept the peace for 40 years, and the people who argue against it can't get over that fact.

FRG's Kohl, Thatcher Meet To Discuss SNF Modernization

Back Flexible Response

*LD3004144489 Hamburg DPA in German 1425 GMT
30 Apr 89*

[Text] Deidesheim (DPA)—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl have come out against a third zero solution on short-range nuclear weapons. After a private talk in the Palatinate village of Deidesheim, the politicians stressed the need to adhere to the NATO strategy of flexible response.

The heads of government told the press on Sunday that problems were openly discussed in a friendly spirit. There were also differing views. Kohl said that he hopes that in talks with the alliance partners, including the United States, a joint basis will be found for the decisions of the NATO summit at the end of May. Mrs Thatcher stressed that the NATO strategy of flexible response made short-range nuclear weapons absolutely necessary.

Disagree on Missile Modernization

*LD3004161989 Hamburg DPA in German 1536 GMT
30 Apr 89*

[Excerpt] Deidesheim (DPA)—The alliance dispute about modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and the pros and cons of a third zero solution continues. During a talk lasting several hours in Deidesheim in the Weinstrasse district, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher failed to achieve any rapprochement in their opposed viewpoints. Whereas Bonn is calling for early negotiations with the Soviets on a reduction of short-range missiles, London rejects this. The British and the Americans are also pressing for a speedy decision on the modernization issue.

Speaking to journalists, Thatcher passionately espoused the NATO deterrence strategy and stressed that short-range nuclear missiles are vital for the preservation of the alliance doctrine. In her view it will be a disaster if

these land-based systems are renounced. In the last 5 years the Soviets have modernized 95 percent of their short-range missiles. The 88 Western Lance systems date from the year 1972.

Referring to his recent government statement, Kohl also spoke about deterrence strategy. But he expressly avoided agreeing with Thatcher's interpretation that both he and she are against a third zero solution on short-range missiles. Kohl expressed the hope that the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May will find a joint strategy which takes into account Germany's special position. Short-range missiles up to a range of 500 km are significant above all to the Germans. There can be no question of the Germans having become unreliable partners. Kohl recalled the defense expenditure already being made by the FRG in the overall interests of NATO.

At the press conference the chancellor did not deny that there are opposing views on the missiles issue. But he did not concede the view that there has been no rapprochement in Deidesheim. The talks have opened up opportunities to achieve the shared goal.

Thatcher concluded her comments on the topic at the press conference by saying that two countries alone cannot alter the position of NATO. The Brussels summit is decisive.

The "Iron Lady" insisted several times that complete removal of short-range nuclear missiles will mean a change in NATO strategy. She cannot go along with this. In this connection she spoke of 'traps' and 'tripwires' for the alliance. [passage omitted]

Talks End in Deadlock

LD3004183889 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1809 GMT 30 Apr 89

[By Chris Moncrieff, PRESS ASSOCIATION chief political correspondent]

[Text] Mrs Thatcher's talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl over a crucial NATO armaments dispute ended in deadlock today. Mrs Thatcher failed to persuade the West German leader to relent over his refusal to modernise the ageing short-range Lance nuclear missiles and step into line with NATO policy. The dispute threatens to divide the alliance and sour relations between Britain and Germany. But after what are believed to have been acrimonious talks in Deidesheim, a Rhineland-Palatinate town, the prime minister remains undaunted. As one British official said afterwards: "It is still all to play for." She intends to renew pressure on the chancellor in the run-up to the NATO summit in Brussels at the end of May.

Labour in London, meanwhile, congratulated Dr Kohl "for paying no attention to Mrs Thatcher's nagging".

The day started off cheerfully enough. Mrs Thatcher, accompanied by Dr Kohl, waved at the crowd as she walked the short distance from the town hall to the Deidesheimerhof hotel where the talks were being held. She was presented with a bottle of 1979 vintage local white wine named after her—the only foreign leader to have received such an honour. Many well-wishers waved miniature Union Jacks as she passed by, but a handful of protesters carried banners attacking Mrs Thatcher's stand on the missile issue.

When the talks ended both leaders described them as "intensive and frank"—on the normal scale of diplomatic language that means they were probably bitter and unfriendly. The chancellor told reporters at a joint press conference afterwards: "We still have quite a lot of work to do." Observers interpreted that to mean no progress was made at all. But he did say he was optimistic that the disagreement could be resolved before the NATO summit—a hope not necessarily shared on the British side.

The issue is threatening to cause a serious split in the Western alliance, something which both Mrs Thatcher and President Bush fear the Kremlin will exploit without mercy. She is believed to have told Dr Kohl there was nothing the Soviet Union wanted more, despite President Gorbachev's fine words, than to see the West disunited. She also believes that the chancellor's position will jeopardise attempts to persuade the Soviets to reduce their huge numbers of conventional forces and chemical stockpiles. Mrs Thatcher said the Soviets have had no compunction in modernising similar weapons which are trained on the West and which outnumber NATO's 12-to-one.

Dr Kohl fears his electoral prospects next year—already shaky—could be jeopardised further if he ignores increasing domestic anger at the presence of these missiles on West German soil.

Mrs Thatcher told the press conference that elimination of short-range nuclear weapons—which is effectively what Dr Kohl's refusal will lead to—would mean that Russia "will have achieved its objective of getting land-based nuclear weapons out of Europe". She said: "This, I believe, would be disastrous for us...short-range nuclear weapons are absolutely vital for flexible response."

But Dr Kohl, although affirming support for key NATO strategy aims, remained adamant. He hoped that a "joint document which takes our special situation into account" could be prepared at the Brussels summit. He insisted: "That has nothing at all to do with the Germans having become unreliable or anything like that. There can be no question of that. We cannot be outshone by anyone in NATO in our reliability."

President Bush will be equally disappointed at the failure to win over Dr Kohl. He too fears the disagreement will play into Soviet hands and that every effort must be made to convince Dr Kohl of that.

But in London, Labour were gleeful at the outcome. Mr Martin O'Neill, shadow defence secretary, said: "I congratulate Chancellor Kohl for paying no attention to Mrs Thatcher's nagging today. The prime minister's campaign to hang on to short-range nuclear weapons at all costs is running into opposition wherever she goes in Europe. Apart from her, all European leaders in both the East and the West want to make rapid progress to arms cuts and see her outdated commitment to nuclear weapon modernisation as a major obstacle to the success of the talks in Vienna."

NATO military officials agree with Mrs Thatcher that total elimination of nuclear tactical weapons would leave the Alliance's troops vulnerable and dismantle NATO's strategy of flexible response.

Britain and the USA reject the West German demand for early negotiations with the Soviet Union on this issue. They say that talks on tactical nuclear arsenals should not begin so long as the Warsaw Pact has a superiority in conventional forces. But the battle of wills between Dr Kohl and Britain and the United States has been no more than deferred. It is a battle which Mrs Thatcher has vowed to win.

Defense White Paper Issued on Soviet 'Threat'
*LD0205122589 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1138 GMT 2 May 89*

[By Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION defence correspondent]

[Text] Strong warnings of the need for NATO to stand firm with up-to-date and effective nuclear weapons in the face of Mr Gorbachev's disarmament proposals are made in the Defence White Paper published today.

In a series of detailed essays and analyses over 20 pages, the government stresses the Soviet Union remains an "objective" military threat with a vast superiority in conventional forces.

And, although not mentioning West Germany by name, the White Paper sends a clear message to Chancellor Kohl that only nuclear weapons can deter war, and that short-range systems are an integral part of NATO strategy and must be kept up to date.

Under Mr Gorbachev, the government says, Soviet foreign policy has acquired a new "flexibility, pragmatism and sensitivity" to the security of other countries, as demonstrated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It welcomes unilateral arms cuts proposals by the Eastern bloc and hopes this will presage constructive negotiations in the conventional arms reductions talks in Vienna.

But it warns: "We should be under no illusion about this new sense of realism—it is designed to serve Soviet interests, not those of the West."

In an essay entitled *Deterrence After the INF Treaty*, the White Paper says: "Flexible response is the only strategic concept that makes sense for a defensive alliance in the nuclear age."

The aim of nuclear weapons can only be to deny an aggressor quick success and to demonstrate he has underrated the defender's resolve.

But, because of the wide range of possible scenarios, NATO must retain several levels of nuclear armoury.

Although the White Paper was printed before Mrs Thatcher's strained meeting with Mr Kohl last weekend, it stresses the need to modernise all nuclear weapons.

Mr Kohl is opposed to the modernisation of the 88 Lance short-range systems based on West Germany, which would involve their replacement with new, more potent weapons, and wants to negotiate them away.

But Lance will be obsolete by the mid-1990s, and the White Paper warns the prevention of war cannot be served by following simultaneously the path of cuts and obsolescence.

"Nothing that Mr Gorbachev has said or done is ground for imagining that he will run military risks with his country's security on suppositions about western goodwill," says the White Paper.

"We must be similarly objective, recognising that if there is indeed a Soviet re-assessment enabling us all to work together more constructively, it would be folly to dismantle, or let decay, the very structures that have helped to induce it.

"Cool and steady realism of this kind is not an obstacle but the best guide to strengthening the security system we seek."

On conventional arms, the White Paper says the Warsaw Pact not only has much larger numbers in most areas but comparable or even superior quality in some fields, such as tanks and artillery systems.

There is deep concern about the Soviet Union's chemical weapons (CW) capability with suspicions that, contrary to Soviet claims, production of CW agents is continuing and testing of the weapons has not been halted.

The government estimates the size of the Soviet stockpile to be several times higher than the 50,000 tonnes claimed and believes that research and development into new agents is continuing.

The government also has "good reason" to believe that the Soviets have stationed chemical weapons in Eastern Europe, and that other members of the Warsaw Pact have produced similar weapons.

There was disappointment at the secrecy and evasiveness which a British delegation met on a visit to the Soviet chemical weapons establishment at Shikany last summer.

The defence budget is to rise above the rate of inflation by about 1 billion pounds sterling in each of the years to 1991-1992, which, the government says, shows its continuing determination to maintain strong and effective forces.

But, although it disposes of talk of the need for a defence review, it has not removed the need for decisions to be made between "priorities".

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